Revolution or realism?  United States-Iran relations in the post-Cold War era by Woodyard, Bruce Leroy
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1993-12
Revolution or realism?  United States-Iran relations
in the post-Cold War era
Woodyard, Bruce Leroy



















Thesis Advisor: Ralph H. Magnus
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704
blic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing
ction. searching existing data sources, gathering and mamtaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of
ormation. Send comments regarding this; burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including
estions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services. Directorate for Information Operations and Reports. 1215
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
Dec 1993
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis, Final
. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Revolution or Realism? United States-Iran Relations in the
Post-Cold War Era
6. AUTHOR(S) Bruce L Woodyard
5. FUNDING NUMBERS









SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.




13 ABSTRACT (maximum 200 wordsjThe end of the Cold War has caused the emergence of regional conflicts and a lack of focus
in United States foreign policy. This situation has resulted in a newly confrontational stance with Tehran, manifested by an
American policy of containment of the Islamic Republic. However, this portrayal of Iran as a pervasive threat to American
interests is a mistake. This study offers an historical analysis of Iran's foreign policy interests and strategic outlook, a discussion
of the dynamics of the Islamic Republic, and a history of United States-Iran relations Strategic concerns have always dominated
this relationship and this continues to be so today. With the Soviet collapse and the defeat of Iraq, an altered and delicate balance
of power exists in Southwest Asia. Iran's strategic importance has thus increased. Furthermore, Tehran must pursue moderation
for a variety of reasons. The author concludes that the United States and Iran share both strategic and economic interests.
America should pursue these shared interests from its current position of strength and gain Iran's cooperation on important issues
United States engagement with Iran would strengthen the pragmatic elements in the government, foster economic development
and improve the security and stability of the region.
14. SUBJECT TERMS Iran, Persian/Arabian Gulf, Middle East, Iranian revolution. Islamic ideology,
foreign policy.


















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Revolution or Realism?
United States-Iran Relations in the Post-Cold War Era
by
Bruce Leroy Woodyard
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., Central Missouri State University, 1981
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





The end of the Cold War has caused the emergence of regional conflicts and a lack of
focus in United States foreign policy. This situation, has resulted in a newly
confrontational stance with Tehran, manifested by an American policy of containment of
the Islamic Republic. However, this portrayal of Iran as a pervasive threat to American
interests is a mistake.
This study offers an historical analysis of Iran's foreign policy interests and strategic
outlook, a discussion of the dynamics of the Islamic Republic, and a history of United
States-Iran relations. Strategic concerns have always dominated this relationship, and this
continues to be so today. With the Soviet collapse and the defeat of Iraq, an altered and
delicate balance of power exists in Southwest Asia. Iran's strategic importance has thus
increased. Furthermore, Tehran must pursue moderation for a variety of reasons.
The author concludes that the United States and Iran share both strategic and economic
interests. America should pursue these shared interests from its current position of strength
and gain Iran's cooperation on important issues. United States engagement with Iran would
strengthen the pragmatic elements in the government, foster economic development and
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The end of the Cold War has caused a lack of focus in United States foreign policy.
Securing peace, democracy and prosperity from this victory has proven elusive. The East-
West struggle, characterized by starkly differing political and economic philosophies, has
been replaced by regional conflicts based on age-old struggles for control of territory and
resources. In this new era a few radical states have emerged as the current threats to
Western interests. Iran is often portrayed as the chief of these new threats. This is partially
due to certain aspects of Iran's own behavior, such as its attempts to acquire nuclear
weapons, and partially due to its radical brand of theocratic Islam. Such factors also make
Iran a credible target for both Western and Middle Eastern governments looking for a
convenient new enemy for their own political purposes. Thus the portrayal of Iran as the
new threat often inaccurately magnifies Tehran's capabilities while belittling its strategic
importance. Such portrayals result in mistaken perceptions and do not serve American
national interests. An accurate portrayal of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the prospects
for United States-Iran relations is needed for policy makers to assess American options in
dealing with Tehran.
This study attempts to offer such a portrayal through historical analysis of American
and Iranian strategic perceptions, current interests and bilateral relations. It also undertakes
a discussion of various dynamics currently affecting Iran in order to properly gauge that
nation's possible future course. These dynamics include ideological, military, economic
and political factors, their development, capabilities and prospects. Finally, there is an
analysis of Washington's current policy and alternative policy options.
American-Iranian relations have always been dominated by common strategy and
shared interests. The United States is a maritime power in the traditional sense, with
economic and political power dependent on control of the sea lanes and access to foreign
resources and markets. Increasing Western reliance on Gulf oil is included in this category
and is therefore viewed as an asset. Formerly, American interests in the Middle East were
dominated by containment of Soviet expansion. Today the prime concerns are security
and stability of the region and the continued flow of oil at moderate prices.
While Iran basically has a continental orientation, it in fact exhibits many elemental
characteristics of a maritime nation, including coastal access and dependence on seaborne
trade. Its system of external trade is if anything more vulnerable than that of its neighbors.
Damaged by a long war and surrounded by existing and potential conflicts, Tehran is
interested in stability and has few reasons to attempt territorial aggrandizement. Thus its
interests and strategic concerns converge with those of the United States.
Iran's unique brand of theocratic Islam is primarily the vision of one man, the late
Ayatollah Khomeini. As such, it is not necessarily shared by other Iranians or Muslims,
either clergy or laymen, and is therefore not hegemonic. While the clerical regime has
become institutionalized to a remarkable degree, it suffers from many contradictions and is
fraught with conflicting political factions. Outside the context of war and revolution it has
enjoyed few successes and must eventually moderate its stance on many issues in order to
proceed with realistic nation-building. The government is still evolving in both form and
substance, and while almost surely remaining "Islamic" will probably move toward the
center.
Iran's military has undergone major transformations since 1979. While more
nationalistic, cohesive and legitimate than it was under the Shah, it is also contending with
serious problems. Not least among these is lack of skilled manpower and adequate logistics
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and production infrastructure. It also lacks the force structure, mobility and effective
command and control capabilities required for modern offensive warfare. Even though
planned acquisitions of modern weapon systems are worrisome, it does not yet have the
ability to absorb or properly support these systems in combat. Above all, it can not be
considered a credible threat to regional order given the presence and proven abilities of
United States forces.
Internally, Iran is experiencing continuing political problems. Though the clerics are
firmly in control of the government, they are divided among themselves. Pragmatic
elements haltingly attempt reforms and amicable relations with the rest of the world, while
extremists cling to power through their revolutionary credentials and radical agenda.
Neither group is strong enough to shift events completely their way, and it is this
dichotomy which causes the outside world so many problems in dealing with Tehran.
The current United States policy is not truly one of containment, but simply one of
sanctioning sensitive material and technology, and attempting to gain a broad consensus on
these sanctions. While a practical step, this action alone is not sufficient to change Iranian
behavior - Washington's stated goal. Critical technology and material will likely be
available through some channels even if international sanctions are adopted, while a
confrontational stance will not allow the regime to moderate. Such a course will only
exacerbate existing tensions and possibly upset the delicate balance of power in the Gulf.
Instead of conflict, the United States should use its position of strength to pursue
cautious, realistic engagement with Iran based on shared economic and strategic interests.
Gaining Iran's cooperation of major issues, including arms proliferation and control, would
strengthen the pragmatic elements in the government, foster economic development, and





The three main foreign policy objectives of the United States during its short
involvement in the Middle East have been to contain Soviet expansion, ensure the flow of
oil and safeguard the existence of Israel. While these goals have been successfully met,
their accomplishment has been more the result of ad hoc response to crises than policy
formulation which would protect American interests by promoting peace and stability in the
region. This is an especially lofty goal in an area with such numerous sources of conflict,
and one largely made impossible by the Cold War and regional polarization. However, the
recent, far-reaching changes in the region and the international system give the United
States more freedom to pursue these goals than before. While it is doubtful that there will
ever be lasting resolution of the many deep-seated conflicts in the Middle East, an
.American approach that is more realistic and even-handed could serve to promote
cooperation, improve economic disparities, de-escalate the arms race and ease tensions in
general.
The end of the Cold War has had wide implications throughout the world. While the
superpowers often had little success in manipulating events or suppressing conflict in the
Middle East, the return to multi-polarity is as important here as it is in the rest of the world.
The direct consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union are numerous. These include
loss of a superpower sponsor for radical states/movements; the end of communism as an
intrusive ideology; the lack of an extra-regional threat to American interests; the impetus
for changing U.S. strategy and military force structure; and less reliance by American
allies, principally Western Europe and Japan, on U.S. military power (divergence of
interests for lack of a common threat). The result is that with the overarching Soviet
threat removed, the U.S. is free to take a realistic approach to the nations and issues of the
Middle East while honestly assessing our own interests - however, other powers are also
free to do the same.
There are also numerous consequences of the Second Gulf War. It conclusively ended
the myth of Arab unity; affirmed the preeminence of the nation-state system despite its
artificiality; proved that the U.S. will go to war to protect its vital interests; provided an
example of international support for enforcing UN resolutions; demonstrated U.S. military
capability and the political will to use it; and confirmed the inability of the GCC states to
defend themselves, thus cementing their reliance on American protection. Results include
a changed regional balance of power in favor of Iran; increased U.S. credibility with Arab
states; pressure for greater political participation in Gulf States; and increased arms sales in
the Gulf area. Additionally, the failure of overt aggression against a neighboring state
proved that the major threat to Gulf regimes in the future is internal vice external.
There were several political initiatives to enhance Gulf security immediately following
the war, the most significant of which were the .Arab-Israeli peace talks, a possible U.S.-
Iranian rapprochement, and the Damascus Declaration. Although promising at first, all of
the above initiatives have suffered setbacks of one form or another. This may lead one to
conclude that the window of opportunity to create cooperation and stability in the region
has closed. However, the basic situation has not been fundamentally altered. The U.S. is
still the sole superpower in the world and the guardian of Gulf oil, Iraq is down but not out,
Iran is attempting a resurgence, Israel is the preeminent regional military power, and the
Palestinian question remains unresolved. It is conceivable that the implementation of a
comprehensive Gulf security policy could still allow the United States to consolidate its
recent victories.
II. THE SECURITY CHALLENGE
A. THE END OF BIPOLARITY
To say that the dramatic changes manifested in the world since 1989 have had a
profound effect on the international system and American foreign policy is an absurd
understatement. The consolidation of the West's long-sought victory in the Cold War is
proving to be as great a challenge as the waging of the struggle itself. As much as
Americans wish to follow their time-honored tradition of withdrawal and demilitarization
after winning a war, they are finding that as dangerous as the communist threat was, it
actually suppressed numerous smaller conflicts that are only beginning to emerge. Often
these conflicts are based on the age-old reasons for man's inhumanity to man, such as
control of territory, commerce, resources, or water, and long-standing ethnic and religious
prejudices. To Americans, immersed in a melting-pot culture and imbued with traditions
of freedom, democracy and capitalism, all re-confirmed by the recent victory, these
struggles seem incomprehensible. The liberal hope that the nations of the world would
willingly devolve into multilateral cooperation and democracy is quickly being dashed on
the rocks of Hobbesian realism. Though it is not easily accepted that a triumphant America
cannot lead the West in enforcing peace and promoting democracy and economic
prosperity now that the Soviet Union is gone, it is equally difficult to justify intervention for
moral reasons and continued defense of our allies in a world suddenly devoid of any clear-
cut ideological struggle. While radically altering the international system and necessitating a
re-definition of our national interests, the "end of ideology" gives the United States greater
freedom to act both morally and realistically, placing undiluted national interests above all
else and treating all nations with an even hand wherever possible. While the future
international system is difficult to predict, it will surely be shaped by the strategy and
national interests of the United States. If America is to continue to lead the world, its
foreign policy must now be more clearly focused than ever before.
B. THE REGIONAL VIEW
While any coherent foreign policy and military doctrine must be shaped by grand
strategy and national interests, it must also take into account the interests and policies of
other nations and their potential reaction to our own moves. There must be a realization
that the Soviet collapse has also had a profound effect on those nations with whom our
interests either coincide or conflict. Even as the superpower rivalry overshadowed all other
concerns for the past half-century, now the lifting of Cold War polarization, in concert with
a globally interdependent economy and the rapid growth and transfer of technology, allows
nation-states to ardently pursue their own interests. Instead of a rush to Wilsonian
liberalism, the continuing affirmation of the nation-state system offers distinct possibilities
for reverting to a realist state of anarchy. 1 In such an environment it is impossible for the
I Tmted States, despite its undoubted power and influence, to follow a broad ideologically-
based course of action which is appropriate for the entire world system. If an anarchic
system prevails, it is necessary for nations to define and follow their strategic interests,
which will undoubtedly vary depending on nation, region, and circumstance, rather than
Western ideas of correct ideological leanings or domestic political systems. This is not to
say that the United States cannot dominate the world, but it will not be able to shape each
country in its own image or enforce peace and stability in accordance with its own ideals.
Nowhere is this more true than in the Middle East. Though this region has long held
strategic interests for foreign powers, its many conflicts of both ancient and modern origins
were less suppressed by the Cold War than anywhere else. Indeed, several Middle East
countries consistently lead the world in arms imports, and the region has been the scene
of numerous wars, revolutions and instances of civil strife which have had profound
implications on the rest of the world. This is not to say that the Cold War had no effect in
this area. Quite the reverse is true. But while the superpowers certainly had vested
interests here, their influence neither prevented armed conflict nor fully achieved their own
ends. Continued diplomatic, military and economic involvement in the region have yielded
numerous U.S. foreign policy frustrations and failures. Indeed it may be argued that there
was rarefy a coherent strategy for the iVliddle East except to contain Soviet expansion,
support Israel, and guarantee access to oil - goals that, while understandable from the U.S.
perspective, certainly did not take into account the myriad problems and conflicts inherent
in the region. From this viewpoint there is little reason to believe that there is any more
chance for peace and success in the future, either in regard to intra-regjonal conflicts or
U.S. policy. However, with the Soviet threat gone and a myopic world view with it, there
is the chance that the U.S. may be able to deal effectively with states in the region from a
realistic perspective, one that honestly assesses each nation's own interests and deals with
them accordingly.
C. NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY
The Gulf War in particular has made it painfully clear that regional conflicts are likely
to be the rule for the foreseeable future and, more importantly, that the lack of a
comprehensive security strategy for the Gulf necessitates continued military presence and
possible action for the United States.
While the overwhelming tactical success of the coalition forces in the liberation of
Kuwait is apparent, the strategic aftermath of the conflict is neither successful nor stable.
With the balancing force of Iraq effectively removed from any tacit Western-Arab
coalition, both Iran and the Arab monarchies strive for dominance in an atmosphere of
mutual distrust. Both sides appear strong on the surface, yet both face daunting obstacles
to their ambitions. Meanwhile the United States protects the GCC, keeps a boot on
Baghdad's neck and warily eyes Tehran.
Yet the current proliferation of weapons and tensions endemic to the region do not
bode well for this precarious situation. Though America's military preponderance is
sufficient to guarantee stability for the time being, the U.S. faces many other challenges in
the world. While decisive military force is vital to the superpower role, this alone cannot
safeguard America's interests. Political and economic measures must be applied
comprehensively from a position of strength if regional security and stability is to be
maintained. If the purpose of war is to make a better peace, this objective has not been
met in regard to the Gulf War. America, and only America, may still achieve this goal,
however. To this end a realistic assessment of the interests of the United States and a
focus on the common security concerns of all Gulf nations is a necessity. Iran is an
inescapable and vital part of any long-term security arrangement in the Gulf.
D. THE DILEMMA OF IRAN
Iran is the quintessential Middle East example of a combination of superpower
involvement, regional conflict and foreign policy failure. This was at least partially due to
the fact that the overarching desire to contain Soviet expansion led policy-makers to ignore
domestic and regional concerns. The United States was not only dealt a major setback by
the Islamic Revolution of 1979, but has since been unable to come to grips with the
revolutionary regime and Iran's own nationalistic and ideological goals. Conversely, Iran
has not yet moderated its own radical stance enough to accept cooperation with the world
system.
Yet it remains a major regional actor, with a large population, oil wealth and a geo-
strategjc position. Furthermore, it is imbued with a radical ideology and a strong sense of
its own nationalism. With the Soviet collapse, the defeat of Iraq and possible international
retrenchment by the United States, Iran has the potential to assume a new importance in
the region. This presents America with her major foreign policy challenge in the Middle
East. How the U.S. chooses to deal with Iran will have long-term implications for the
security and stability of the region. To assess this situation an examination of U.S. and
Iranian strategy and interests is appropriate.
III. UNITED STATES STRATEGY AND INTERESTS
A. A MARITIME POWER
The United States is a maritime power in the classic sense, following the earlier
traditions of the Portuguese, Dutch and, of course, the British. This strategic tradition has
its roots in liberal economic ideas of free international trade and access to resources.
In this ....perspective, the system of external trade... contribute(s) to prosperity in
peacetime and represent(s) a potential strategic asset in wartime. These benefits ... only
accrue if access to resources (can) be secured at their source and the sea lines of
communication protected...
There are three key aspects to this strategy: 1 ) Dependence on foreign markets and
resources is viewed as an asset to be defended rather than a liability, 2) The strategy of
access to and defense of key areas is a maritime one, and 3) The impetus for action is
based on vital interests and maintaining the status quo. Although this principle views
dependence on foreign resources as an asset, it also acknowledges that it is a vulnerability
which could be exploited by one's enemies. Such dependence, however, is viewed as an
accepted vulnerability, one which is economically more cost-effective and politically and
militarily more feasible to exploit and defend, if necessary, than working toward domestic
self-sufficiency or attempting to gain direct control of such resources.
America, as modern successor to the Pax Britannica and an "island nation" in many
respects, has followed the same strategy. Though not heavily dependent on imported raw
materials (except oil), the United States economy is dependent on export markets for both
raw materials and finished goods in the rest of the world. Furthermore America's western
allies, the major industrial nations of the world, are heavily dependent on raw materials
imported from abroad in the traditional sense. Since the industrial might of the West forms
the economic engine of world prosperity, the U.S. is dependent on secure lines of
communication, international trade and access to resources and markets. This is
increasingly true with the emergence of a multi-polar world with no clear cut, worldwide
threat and heavily interdependent economies. Though our allies are even more dependent
on international trade than is the U.S., only the United States possesses the military
wherewithal to defend these vital supply assets and keep the lines of communication
secure.
A maritime strategy is normally implemented by protecting lines of communication,
securing strategically located bases, and gaining commercial access to overseas resources
and markets. The prime example of this is the maritime empire of 1 9th century imperial
Britain, especially regarding the lifeline to India. Obviously such an approach places a
heavy premium on the preponderance of sea power and suitable agreements with regional
states which make it possible to deploy forces rapidly in the event of crises. America
successfully pursued just such a strategy of forward deployment throughout much of the
world during the Cold War, and used the same approach to telling effect during the Gulf
War. However, much of this strategy depends on the good will of allies in granting U.S.
basing rights and facilities. In the post-Cold War era wherein vital interests are difficult to
identify and reach a consensus on, the world is in many respects less dependent on U.S.
protection, and many nations are in a state of accelerated political development, access to
forward bases is much less certain. In this environment, it is necessary for the United
States to build security and stability from a position of military strength but with more than
just military means.
As stated above, a maritime approach is driven by identification and defense of
spheres of vital interests. This concept carries two distinct meanings. First is that the
maritime power in question does not seek direct control or possession of the vital interest
area or resource, merely access to and defense of it. Thus, a maritime strategy is not
necessarily an imperialistic or intrusive approach that is in conflict with the interests or
independence of regional states, although it can be construed as such. Second is the
maritime power's desire to "moderate regional antagonisms and promote favorable political
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outcomes at the local and regional level." 5 This factor is a point at the heart of this essay.
The maritime power's need to promote security and stability in areas of vital interest is
linked directly to the requirement for access to resources and markets. It is impossible to
enjoy unhindered access to vital resources in an area which is inherently unstable and
fraught with continual conflict. Though superior military power is necessary to this end,
military superiority alone cannot suppress or control all the indigenous conflicts of a region.
Furthermore, great power involvement in complex internal and intra-state conflicts has a
dismal record of failure. Though the continuing legitimacy of the maritime strategic
approach to warfare and defense of vital interests was demonstrated perfectly in the Gulf
War of 1990-91, America failed both to deter the conflict and to create any long-term
stability in its aftermath. A maritime power is not only characteristically supportive of the
status quo, it should also be vitally interested in conflict resolution and deterrence - in short,
long-term security and stability of a region of vital interest.
B. DEFTNTTTON OF AMERICAN INTERESTS
Since the maritime strategic approach includes identification of areas of vital interest, it
is necessary to explore these interests and their relevance in the post-Cold War world.
1. Promoting Stability
During the Cold War Soviet containment was the United States' primary concern in
the Middle East. While Soviet expansion is no longer a threat, the Soviet collapse brings
forth a host of new and less well-defined problems. These include the stability of
governments in Moscow and the new republics; economic development; ethnic, religious
and nationalistic strife; and the proliferation of weapons and technology. The Soviet
disintegration also has larger implications regarding Middle East nations that border the
CIS, were under Soviet dominance or have ethnic or religious ties with the peoples
involved. The breakup effects Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.
Directly threatening America's interests is the rise of regional powers, such as Iran and Iraq,
which now have more freedom to act in their own interests. If the Cold War held any
interstate or inter-regional conflicts in check, this controlling influence is now gone. Rather
than combatting communist expansionism, the problem is now one of promoting stability,
reducing arms sales, and curtailing the proliferation of critical military technology and
weapons of mass destruction. In order to ensure continued American access to vital
resources, economic and political development must strengthen the nations involved while
tensions and military build-ups are controlled. This is a daunting task given the fluid
political and economic situations and delicate societies of Southwest Asia. Since American
presence is limited in many areas of the region, this cannot be done by the U.S. alone, or
by purely military means. It will take a cooperative effort and a combination of economic,
diplomatic, intelligence and military assets. Thus broad consensus and cooperation on
these issues is a requirement, but such a consensus is exceedingly difficult to arrive at when
a monolithic threat disappears and interests diverge. Any multinational effort at promoting
stability must not be undertaken only by traditional allies in Western Europe. It must focus
on regional nations and interests they have in common with the United States.
2. Oil
The second of America's vital interests in the Middle East in the post-Cold War era
can be summed up in three words - oil, oil and oil. The reason for United States
involvement in the Gulf is to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil at moderate prices, and to
prevent any single state or ruler from controlling the reserves. Any major drop in
production or sale, or drastic increase in prices, would be detrimental to the globally
interdependent economy which runs on Gulf crude.
There are obviously arguments to the contrary. The point is often made that oil
prices are currently low and the invasion of Kuwait and subsequent destruction of the fields
hardly caused a change in prices or supply. Furthermore, the oil-producing states' GDP
and government revenues rely heavily on the sale of crude. The suppliers are at least as
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dependent on selling as the industrialized nations are on buying. As long as they are not in
alliance with each other it prevents them from controlling the supply and prices too closely.
Even virulently anti-Western regimes cannot drink their oil, they must sell it. Therefore the
current situation of heightened regional antagonisms benefits the West. It is an economic
form of divide and conquer.
While this argument has some merit, the fact is that the oil supplier and consumer
nations are in a cycle of mutual dependence. If the price of crude per barrel is too low the
suppliers do not get the necessary revenues. If it goes too high alternative sources - both
more expensively produced petroleum and other fuels - become economically feasible. So
the suppliers have a limited range of prices which they can manipulate (although they can
push it to the upper limit of this range). Similarly, the West is dependent on Gulf oil
because it is not onfy some of the best quality crude in the world, it is also the easiest and
least expensive to lift. It is currently economically infeasible to develop alternative energy
sources and it is economically and politically cost-effective to rely on the vast but
admittedly vulnerable fields of the Gulf. There is no major change to this mutual
dependence situation in the foreseeable future. Thus the major threat to the world's key oil
supply is not some type of price fixing but recurrent war and instability and potentially the
irrational actions of some national leader or non-national group. Since, as stated above, the
suppliers are equally dependent on selling their resource, the threats to and interests of
these states are the same as those of the West. Thus supplier and consumer interests
converge. For both groups the top priorities are security and stability of the region and the
continued flow of oil at reasonable prices.
Strategic concerns vis-a vis the Soviet Union have always headed the list of
American priorities in the Middles East. Despite the Soviet breakup and the increasing
importance of world economics, and due to increasing mutual dependence of oil supplier
and consumer nations, strategic interests still dominate. While the U.S. has proven that oil
is a vital resource which the country will go to war to protect, it was not the only reason for
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American action in 1990-91. Preservation of the status quo and deterrence and
punishment of wanton aggression were broader concerns that warranted resort to armed
force. Similarly, "control over the resources of Kuwait...was not an objective in its own
right for Saddam Hussein, but an essential action in a quest for broader political, military
and economic hegemony in the Middle East... it appears that resource-related needs and
objectives have tended to be determined by broader strategic aims" instead of the reverse.
While the military option is viable and even necessary to protect vital economic and
strategic interests, it is extremely costly by any measure. External military force has also
proven woefully inadequate to deter threats of domestic instability and discontent. Thus, it
is in the interest of the U.S. and all Gulf nations not only to safeguard the oil fields and
navigability of the Gulf, but to promote stability and cooperation among the states of the
region. Promoting security and stability in the vital Gulf region is arguably America's
number one concern for the Middle East.
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IV. IRAN: STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS AND HISTORICAL INTERESTS
A CONTINENTAL ORIENTATION
If .America is a maritime power in the classic sense, Iran is a nation of continental
orientation. Tehran and the other urban centers of Iran are primarily situated on the
Iranian plateau. As such, they have an landward orientation and are historically tied to
Central Asia, Transcaucasia, Afghanistan and Russia by patterns of trade and culture.
They are also directed toward Turkey and Central Asia by a history of conflict, which
squeezed the Safavids between the Ottoman Fmpire and invading Uzbeks. For nearly two
hundred years an expansionist Russian Empire/Soviet Union posed a major threat on Iran's
northern borders, one which was more immediate, intrusive and persistent than any the
British and Americans could pose.
Yet the word "orientation" is important here, for Iran cannot strictly be considered a
continental power in the traditions of Napoleonic France, Germany, and Russia. These
states have historically followed continental strategies which viewed the system of free
trade as a vulnerability and the maritime powers as hostile and encircling. In this view such
vulnerability must be overcome by gaining direct control of resources and territory in order
to achieve larger political aims. For these land-based powers, the strategy of access is
continental vice maritime and action is based on revisionist geopolitics instead of defense of
vital interests.
7 Although Iraq followed this course precisely in invading both Iran and
Kuwait, Iran does not necessarily share this strategy. It would be a mistake to put both
countries in the same mold.
Significantly, the traditional continental powers did not possess the raw materials,
coastal access, naval power or system of and dependence on trade that the maritime nations
did. Iran, therefore, shares characteristics of each. Their history is one of being invaded
by continental powers, they have significant natural resources and coastline, and they are
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extremely dependent on international trade. Furthermore, with rare exceptions, Iran has
seldom strived for territorial conquest outside the present borders. Rather, they have tried
to assert their independence and territorial integrity and to exercise regional power through
political means. They tend to be a status quo vice a revisionist power. Despite their
continental, geo-political outlook and undoubted quest for self sufficiency, Iran is not
firmly in the mold of a threatening continental power in the traditional sense. However, the
geo-political outlook of Iran is still important to understand the nation's strategic approach
and interests.
B. GEO-STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF IRAN
1. "The Center of the Universe"8
Though the above phrase has been used as part of the grandiose title of Iranian
monarches, it is not without a partial basis in fact. If one views a map of the eastern
hemisphere and mentally draws an "X" across the land mass stretching from southern
Africa to the Bering Strait and from Northwest Europe to Southeast Asia, it is apparent
that Iran comes very close to the center of it all (of course the entire Middle East does also,
but it is Iranian perceptions that are important here). Iran has occupied a position of
strategic geographic significance since ancient times. Situated between the Caspian Sea
and central Asian steppes on the north and the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean on the
south, Iran is astride the natural land and water routes between East and West. Merchants,
peoples and invading armies continually passed through and often stayed. The Persian
plateau has either formed an important part of numerous empires or served as a buffer
between rival powers for centuries. Iran has sometimes been the ends and more often the
means of influence and expansion for outside powers.
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It is no less so today. A coastline reaching from the Shatt-al-Arab across the Strait
of Hormuz to the Indian Ocean puts Iran in a commanding position in the vital Gulf, an
area holding the bulk of the world's proven oil reserves. Farther north, Tehran looks
toward the rich but uncertain Caucasian region and the emerging, resource-laden and
predominantly Muslim Central Asian republics. No other nation borders both of these
potentially vital and unstable regions. Though the North-South axis has taken on new
significance with the Soviet collapse, Iran still links East and West, particularly the eastern
and western ends of the Muslim world. It is also near the borders of China and India, both
economically developing nations and regional superpowers possessing a large portion of the
world's population as well as nuclear weapons. The slogan of the Islamic Revolution,
"Neither East nor West", though intended to have religious and cultural meaning, holds
geographic connotations as well. Far from being of less importance in the post-Cold War
era, Iran's geographic and strategic position is dramatically enhanced, especially in Tehran's
view. This view is bound to shape Iranian national ambitions and foreign policy in the new
era.
C. A LEGACY OF CULTURE AND CONQUEST
Like all modem nation-states, Iran's world view is shaped by its own culture and sense
of history. In Iran, however, this takes on a complex double character of both superiority
and inferiority, what Fuller terms "a profound schizophrenia". Iranians, as a nation,
believe in the innate supremacy of their civilization and culture. Persia was the origin of
one of the great ancient world empires, the Achaemenid, established nearly 2,500 years
ago by Cyrus the Great. Since that time, several other kingdoms have held sway there,
particularly the Parthian, Sassanid and Safavid. Notably, none of these latter three were
conquered by competing western empires. This long, but hardly continuous, tradition of
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political dominance and importance of the Persian heartland gives Iranians a strong sense
of nationalism and independence not shared by most other Middle Eastern states, many of
which have appeared on the map only in this century.
Conversely, Iran has also suffered many lengthy periods of invasion and domination by
outside forces, including Greeks, Arabs, Turks, Mongols, Afghans, Russians, British and,
to a lesser extent, Americans. This experience has given Iran a sense of inferiority,
insecurity, suspicion, and xenophobia. Iranians are predisposed to see their nation as the
prize of foreign empires, subject to constant political conspiracy and manipulation. This is
particularly so when Iran has been politically weak relative to the foreign power in
question. Indeed, three key events of this century support this perception: the Anglo-
Russian division of the country into spheres of influence in 1907; the Anglo-Soviet
occupation in 1941, and the Anglo-American backed overthrow of Prime Minister
Mossadegh in favor of the last Shah in 1953. In light of these events, the 1979
Revolution can be seen not only as the ouster of a monarch, but the ending of foreign
domination and the re-establishment of true Iranian independence for the first time in over
two centuries.
Thus, Iran has undergone many alternating periods of both political ascendancy and
subjugation. It is this combination of positive and negative experience that gives Iran its
conflicting national character and forms the chief variable in Iranian foreign relations.
If political power is a major variable in Iran's history, Persian culture is an important
constant and stabilizing influence. 2 Though frequently suffering under foreign rulers,
Persian culture remained a dominant force, often heavily influencing the conquerors.
Alexander is said to have married a Persian princess and adopted Persian customs. Under
the Arab Abassid Caliphate, Persian officials, art, architecture and literature dominated the
empire and contributed greatly to its "golden age". With the political ascendancy of the
Safavid dynasty, the adoption of Shiism as the state religion further strengthened the native
culture and its singular character. Today, surrounded as they are by Arabs, Turkomen,
16
Kurds, Baluch, .Afghans, and many other groups, the unique, isolated and enduring nature
of their ethnicity, language and culture serve to impart to Iranians a feeling of cultural
superiority and well-developed national identity. Five hundred years as the only Shiite state
and the current identification as an Islamic Republic under clerical rule onfy enhance Iran's
particular national personality and shape Tehran's world view.
D. AREAS OF IRANIAN NATIONAL INTEREST
The purpose of this paper is not to define the Iranian national interest, nor is it to
explore Iran's relations with each of her neighbors. However, in examining potential
foreign policy objectives and directions it is first necessary to briefly identify where the
chief geo-political interests lie.
Today, the Soviet collapse presents Iran with both challenges and opportunities. While
the looming imperialist threat has disappeared, newly independent states in the Caucasus
and central Asia are rife with instability and internal ethnic conflict, problems which have
larger connotations regarding both Iran's large ethnic minorities and relations with Turkey,
itself a member ofNATO and close ally of the United States. However, the lifting of
Soviet hegemony brings opportunities for influence and expansion in the developing and
predominantly Muslim northern frontiers. It is arguable that the major focus of Iranian
interest lies in resource-laden Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Iran also has substantial interests to the east. Though significantly threatened by the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic was only marginally supportive of the
mujahadin opposition. This is probably due to the fact that Afghanistan is predominantly
Sunni and perpetually wary of Iranian expansion. However, with the Soviet withdrawal
and subsequent collapse, Iran will doubtless attempt to increase predominance in this area
in order to support stability and create links to their ethnic and linguistic cousins, the Tajiks.
Pakistan has long maintained good relations with Iran and is a strongly Islamic nation.
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Significantly, though decrying the United States, Iran maintained ties with Pakistan and
Turkey, both U.S. allies, following the revolution. Pakistan's long-standing conflict with
India, the Muslim-Hindu strife in that country, and Pakistan's nuclear program, strategic
coastline and shared Baluchi minority are all reasons for Iranian concern and opportunities
in the east. We can expect Tehran's interest to continue in this area.
To the west and south Iran faces the Arab world and the Gulf. Centuries of political
and ethnic conflict between Arab and Persian, far from being eased by common religion
and anti-imperialist sentiments, continues to this day. Iran has rarely formed any alliances,
formal or otherwise, with Arab states, monarchical Iraq, Oman and, currently, Syria are
exceptions. The discovery of oil added increased interest in the Gulf region itself to long-
standing competition with the rulers of Mesopotamia. The Iran-Iraq War in particular took
on overtones of ethnic rivalry.
Unlike the "Northern Tier" arrangements, superpower involvement and Cold War
pressures have either prevented or failed to develop any regional security organization
which encompassed all Gulf states. Iran, with controlling geographic position, large
population and latent economic and military potential, has long posed a threat to the Arab
monarchies. This drastically increased with the establishment of a revolutionary regime in
Tehran. There is no doubt that Iran sees itself as the predominant regional power and will
seek to realize this position whenever possible. The fact that American interests are deeply
entrenched in the area only serves to heighten the tension there. Due to this common stake
in the region, the Gulf will be the major focus of the policy questions to be addressed
below.
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E. IRANIAN INTEREST IN DOMINATING THE GULF
As stated above, Iran's interest has traditionally centered on the plateau heartland, the
Caucasus and central Asia. The Gulf itself, though an important waterway, is separated
from Tehran by mountains and deserts, and was long an undeveloped and remote area.
However, at periods of Iranian political ascendancy, when the heartland was secure from
foreign intervention, interest would invariably rum to the southern coasts. Although true
Iranian dominance was only intermittently established in the Gulf, no other regional power
could achieve even that much. While Tehran's claims today, either to territory or simply
dominance, are more a product of historic myth and nationalistic nostalgia, they are
probably as good as those of any other state. Additionally, in postulating foreign policy
goals, a nation's perception of its role is often as important as fact, and it is a pervasive
Iranian perception that they should rightfully control the gulf.
1. Arab or Persian Gulf?
Although "a rose by any other name" may well apply to American policy-makers,
to the people of the states surrounding it, the title of ihe Gulf is an extremely important
issue. Indeed,
the name Persian GulJ describes the problem... the name contains the seeds of the issue:
Whose Gulf is this strategic body of water? For Iran, with its acute sense of historical
roots stretching back to the first millennium B.C., the term is fraught with pride,
1
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suggestive of a historical Persian aegis over the waterway. lJ
The title "Persian" has in fact been the accepted term at least since Portuguese usage in the
sixteenth century. In recent years, the Arab states have objected to this appellation,
preferring "Arabian Gulf' instead. The United States military has also adopted this term to
show solidity with .\rab allies. Yet the fact is that a name cannot confer ownership on an
international body of water, so that the Gulf is neither Arab nor Persian, just as the Indian
Ocean and Gulf of Mexico are not "owned" or controlled by the nations for which they are
named. This fact, however, does little to lessen the political sensitivities involved.
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To the extent that a nation-state or ethnic group can claim dominion (as separate
from military control) over an international waterway, the issue is one of the preeminent
character of the area. What degree of cultural dominance, then, does Iran enjoy over the
Gulf? Even taking the view that Persian culture has been the consistent factor in Iranian
history as opposed to inconsistent politico-military power, there is evidence that Persian
influence rarely if ever reached to the Gulf for a long enough time to make it a culturally
Persian area. In fact, it was primarily seagoing Arabs from the southern and western
shores of the Gulf that inhabited the Iranian coastline, and, aside from European powers,
the preeminent naval presence in the Gulf was that of piratical Arabs. Conversely, the
Persians have virtually no maritime traditions and only rarely attempted to establish
themselves as a seagoing entity. These facts would speak for the Gulf (or at least its
coastlines and history) being more Arab than Persian in character.
As with most complex issues, there is another side to the story. Iranians also
inhabited the Arab side of the water and continue to do so today, with large populations of
ethnic Iranians in Bahrain, the UAE and Oman. The result is that culture and traditions are
mixed in this area, as immigrants tend to take on the character of the land they enter.
Before the twentieth century, with the rise of modern nation-states and the advent of travel
and communication technology, the Gulf waterway was actually less of a "gulf'- a drvision-
than it was a link. With mountains, deserts and marshes surrounding the area on all sides,
the water provided the cheapest and easiest means of transportation and served to unite, to
a small degree, the coastal settlements which were isolated from the inland civilizations.
Thus, the Gulf developed its own character, neither Arab nor Persian but a mix of each.
Most of the time regional states were too weak or disinterested to attempt their own control
and so the distinction did not really matter until fairly recently.
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What does matter is that the Gulf shores are of mixed character and therefore
potentially divisive politics. This is of fundamental importance in considering the
promotion of regional stability and cooperation. Therefore,
any security scheme must recognize the Gulf region's unique ethnic, religious, and
cultural characteristics, as well as its geographic integrity. It is particularly important to
recognize the ethnic and religious interpenetration of the Gulfs northern and southern
shores and its dual Arab and Iranian character. Any effort to exclude or isolate any
country dooms any arrangement. In fact, cooperation and coexistence between the two
sides of the Gulf will become more rather than less necessary in the post-(Gulf) War
period.
2. Attempts at Iranian Sea Power
Though dominant culture is undoubtedly important, the matter of political control
must also be addressed. Iran is by far the longest-established nation-state in the Gulf
region, boasting a predominant civilization and political empire more than one thousand
years before the time of Muhammed. It has the largest population of any state in the area
and a coastline running the length of the gulf and extending outside it. It is the onfy
regional power to establish political and military control in the Gulf, however brief and
tenuous that control may have been.
Of course European powers actually controlled the Gulf, politically, economically
and militarily, from the sixteenth century when the Portuguese arrived until 1971 when the
British officially withdrew. European control was only intermittently challenged by
indigenous forces. The Safavid ruler Shah Abbas the Great conspired with the British and
Dutch to drive the Portuguese from Hormuz in 1622. * 5 Although this resulted in naval
control by the European allies rather than by the Safavids, the latter at least had a political
hand in the affair, and so it is an important episode from the Iranian perspective. The
Safavids, however, were soon distracted by events in the north, and under weaker men
than Shah Abbas Persian interest in the Gulf quickly waned.
The most complete Persian control of the Gull came under Nadir Shah, who rose
to prominence after the fall of the Safavids. He was a strong military leader, driving out
the Afghans who had destroyed the Safavid dynasty and even reaching India, where he
seized and brought back the famous Peacock Throne. Turning to the Gulf, he established
Persian control "from Basra to the Makran coast of present day Pakistan... recaptured
Bahrain, and took part of Oman in 1737. " He then began to build a Persian naval
presence, establishing Bushire as headquarters and acquiring twenty to thirty ships. The
fact that he relied on foreign sailors, mainly Portuguese and Indians, merely demonstrates
Iran's lack of a maritime tradition. Building a naval force with no existing, indigenous
structure or expertise is a long-term project, and the work ceased with Nadir's death in
1747 before any naval presence could truly be manifested.
However short-lived was Nadir Shah's ascendancy, it was the closest any regional
state had come to establishing hegemony over the Gulf. It was also the last attempt at
Iranian sea power until the twentieth century. As such it is a significant event and provides
historical precedent for current Iranian claims to dominance and also to territorial claims to
Bahrain and certain Gulf islands.
After Nadir's assassination, the weak Qajar dynasty showed little inclination to get
involved in the Gulf, preferring to grant concessions to foreign political and business
interests rather than strengthen Persian sovereignty. It was not until Reza Shah's rise to
power in 1920 that another ruler seriously challenged European control of the gulf. Due to
Iran's internal problems he concentrated on nation-building, but he did manage to bring the
Persian coasts more firmly under Tehran's control. He also established and improved ports
and began shipbuilding operations, but these were more for commercial than naval
1 8
purposes. 0 While Britain lost long-standing influence over tribal rulers who traditionally
controlled the coasts, their naval hegemony was by no means threatened by Reza's actions.
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Iran made its next bid for Gulf hegemony under Mohammed Reza Shah, who,
after 1953, became the most important American strategic ally in the Middle East.
Although his primary use to the United States was as a bulwark against the Soviet Union,
the Shah also had his own ambitions in the Gulf and even the Indian Ocean. He saw Iran
as an emerging world power and constantly compared his regime to the ancient
Achaemenid Empire. The British withdrawal, the Nixon Doctrine, a U.S. policy of
unlimited weapon sales, 19 and the oil boom combined to give him the opportunity to
exercise Iran's military power. Though he did not press claims to Bahrain, the Shah did
occupy the strategic islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs only one day
prior to the official British pullout. More importantly, he demonstrated regional military
might by helping to crush the Dhofar rebellion in Oman in 1975. This near-hegemonic
military power and open U.S. backing also helped the Shah secure the favorable Algiers
Accord with Iraq regarding the Shatt-al-Arab. Tehran accelerated its military build-up,
particularly its air and naval forces, with an eye to controlling Gulf sea lanes and exercising
limited power projection into the Indian Ocean.
Construction of a major naval and air base at Chan Bahar, outside the Straits on the
Gulf of Oman, is testimony to the Shah's wider aspirations. Possession of one of the
world's largest hovercraft fleets, acquisition of F-14 interceptors and planned acquisition of
modified Spruance class guided missile destroyers21 and ex-American diesel submarines
could have given Iran significant ability to influence events and effect a measure of sea
control in the region. However, the navy's ability to muster enough trained personnel to
effectively operate and maintain such complex platforms remains problematical. *•
The Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and minor naval skirmishes with U.S forces
seriously damaged the Iranian navy and any pretense to regional sea power. However,
interest in the Gulf has not abated in the least, and Tehran realizes that it must project some
credible naval forces in order for its ambitions to be fulfilled. To this end Iran's well-
publicized rearming program includes two Kilo class diesel attack submarines purchased
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from Russia." Iran has thus gained the first submarine capability of any Gulf state, a
major achievement. While actual operational capability has yet to be assessed and this
acquisition may be largely symbolic and political in nature, it is indicative of Iran's
determination to secure a legitimate military role for itself in Gulf security.
While Iranian interest in the Gulf has waxed and waned with domestic political
strength and stability, it was solidified with the creation of a modem nation-state and the
discovery of oil. Unfortunately for Iran, world powers have also been interested in a
region it considers its own, and for the same compelling reasons. While Iran has only
intermittently established its hegemony in the Gulf (normally when outside powers either
supported this or were absent) the persistent Iranian perception is that this waterway is
theirs to dominate - or at least that Gulf security should be left to the riparian states.
Additionally, this presumption is supported by the geo-political realities and at least some
historical fact.
In the issue of Gulf control, we see the double-sided Iranian national character
magnified. "Indeed, much of Iran's historical frustration probably stems from the contrast
between possessing the dominant state power in the overall region for long periods-
compared to a weaker, less-developed Arabian Peninsula-and Iran's historic impotence in
actually being able to exert some control over Gulf events..." Facts aside, it is often
perceptions that count and the Iranian vision of Gulf predominance is not likely to change
in the foreseeable future. From the U.S. perspective, however, Iranian perceptions have
rarely become reality and cannot if America retains it dominant position in the Gulf.
In examining Iran's historical interests and relations, several significant trends
emerge which must be noted in order to understand Iran's situation and future course of
action. Factors of continuity in Iranian history are those of culture, nationalism and
religion, while political primacy is a factor of change. It is important to note that the
former have survived and shown resiliency even when the nation is under outside control,
and it is these forces which provide the strength and consistency of the Iranian nation.
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Conversely, the political fortunes of Iran have been more extreme and short-lived, and are
often a reaction to a prior situation of foreign domination, cither perceived or real. A
strong nationalist leader occasionally arises and reasserts Iranian independence, as in the
case of Abbas the Great, Nadir Shah, Reza Khan or the Ayatollah Khomeini. However,
this reactive situation is inconsistent and must eventually moderate. This is exactly the case
with Tehran today, although it is not as clear cut as in the past due to modern power
relationships and political systems.
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V. RELATIONS WITH MAJOR POWERS
A. RUSSIA/SOVIET UNION
As stated earlier, the Russian/Soviet empires have long constituted the primary political-
military threat to Iran. Though little cultural or ideological menace, an expansionist,
militarized state with growing global power and shared borders could hardly be ignored.
During the rule of the weak Qajar dynasty, Russia continually intruded on Persian
soveriegnty, a condition which culminated in the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907.
Moscow had succeeded not only in controlling the Central Asian and Caucasian regions
which Tehran traditionally regarded as its own preserve, but in penetrating the heartland of
the Persian plateau as well. Though the Bolshevik Revolution brought a hiatus in this
attitude and enabled the conclusion of a treaty favorable to Tehran in 1921, Soviet interest
soon was revived. This was typified by the abortive creation of the Republic of Gilan in
1920-21 (albeit prior to the above-mentioned treaty), the Soviet occupation of northern
Iran and the ouster of Reza Shah in 1941, and the Soviet-backed Republics of Azerbaijan
and Mahabad in 1945-46. As stated by Soviet Ambassador Petrovsky in the inter-war
period,
What counts in Persia is North Persia only, and the latter is fully dependent on
Russia... This is Russia's strength...
His remarks were made in regard to economic matters, but they adequately demonstrate
the situation.
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Soviet economic and political interest in the region continued during the last Shah's
reign. In spite of the Shah's role as a bulwark against communist expansionism, by the late
1960s there were considerable economic relations between the two countries.
The Soviet Union built one steel plant and a natural gas pipeline; the Shah purchased
one billion dollars worth of light arms during the 1967-78 period; and he sold natural gas
to the Soviet Union. Despite a prolonged effort by the Shah to serve as the gendarme of
the Western interests in the Gulf, the Soviet Union ... did not feel threatened by his
role.
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Notwithstanding this cooperation, the Soviets were undoubtedly pleased with the collapse
of American influence resulting from the Shah's downfall.
Though hoping for better relations with an anti-American regime, the Soviets were
disappointed by Khomeini's characterization of them as the "Lesser Satan" and the
espousement of the "neither East nor West" policy, which put them roughly in the same
category as the United States. Aside from rhetoric, two major events also complicated the
Kremlin's relations with Iran. The first was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
December, 1979 and the subsequent prolonged occupation of and guerilla warfare in that
country. Iran could not help but view this action as a major threat to its security. The
second was the Iran-Iraq war. In spite of Moscow's 1972 friendship treaty with Baghdad,
which obligated the USSR to supply military equipment to Iraq in event of a conflict, the
Soviets at first tried to remain neutral. By late 1982, however, it became apparent that
neutrality would not win over the Tehran government and the Kremlin resumed military
shipments to Iraq. Still, the Soviets realized that a victory by either side would not be in
their best interests, and supplied equipment to Iran through such client states as North
Korea, Syria, Libya and Warsaw Pact nations.28 This balancing policy was similar to that
adopted by the United States. This underscores three significant factors: Soviet interest in
gaining influence in Iran, the desire to maintain Iran as at least a nominally stable regional
actor, and the difficulty inherent in pursuing open relations with the ideologically radical
Tehran regime. This, too, proved to mirror the American situation.
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The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the subsequent disintegration of the
Soviet Union, and the emergence of independent states between Russia and Iran has
drastically changed the balance of relations between Moscow and Tehran, with the latter
conceivably having the upper hand for the first time in centuries. Still, the mutual interest
and interdependence has not been fundamentally altered. The transfer of weapons and
technology for badly needed cash (or oil and natural gas) is an especially troubling aspect
of the two countries' relationship. While the future shape of government, economy and
society in Russia and the CIS is difficult to predict, current conditions indicate that for the
near term the focus of Moscow-Tehran dealings will be primarily economic in nature.
However, common strategic interests cannot be ruled out. With sizable Russian minorities,
resources and nuclear weapons in this region, Moscow and Tehran have a mutual stake in
promoting stability. General disarray in the CIS and Iranian competition with Turkey for
influence there may point to future Russian-Iranian cooperation. This is further reason for
U.S. strategic interest in and cooperation with Iran.
B. GREAT BRITAIN
Britain's original interest in Iran was as protection of the lifeline to India, rather than in
control of the country itself. With Iran a means rather than an end, Britain was thus less a
direct political-military threat to Tehran's sovereignty than was Russia. The British were
also less interested in the Persian heartland, with its traditional trade and culture, than in the
backwater of the Gulf coasts and southern mountains, which were primarily tribal in nature
and only loosely controlled by Tehran. However, London's economic interests began to
heighten with the aborted tobacco concession of 1 892, and were forever altered with the
discovery of oil in Khuzestan in 1908. Though the 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement (prior
to the discovery of oil) left Khuzestan out of the British sphere of influence, they
controlled tribal loyalties in the province, and the Admiralty quickly moved to make this the
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main source of the Royal Navy's oil supply. World War I brought British military forces
into Iran, but this was to suppress German intervention among the tribes and support the
main effort in Mesopotamia, rather than to control Tehran itself. " British military
cutbacks after the war and the rise of a strong nationalistic leader in the person of Reza
Shah temporarily held London's interests at bay and made Iran "more independent" than it
had been in nearly 150 years. Still, as with Russia, British economic power and influence
proved pervasive, and Iran's growing dependence on oil revenues forced cooperation to
keep production going. Although Reza Shah negotiated an oil concession more favorable
to Iran than the original one, British government and business interests were never really
damaged.
Strategic concerns arose again with World War II, when the joint Anglo-Soviet
occupation of the country in 1941 halted German influence and secured a supply route to
assist the hard-pressed Red Army. Military occupation and the ouster of Reza Shah could
onfy be viewed by Iranians as the most blatant disregard for their sovereignty, the Tripartite
Treaty (January, 1942) and Allied Declaration (December, 1943), both assuring Iran of its
independence, notwithstanding. * In spite of the timely withdrawal of British forces after
the war, resentment not only continued but was focused by nationalistic politicians on
foreign control of the oil industry under the guise of the AIOC. This situation came to a
head under Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1951-53, when attempted nationalization of the
industry and the resulting boycott strained British-Iranian relations to the breaking point.
The ouster of Mossadegh and re-instatement of Mohammed Reza Shah by the army (with
strong Anglo-American support: after his re-instatement the Shah told the CIA's Kermit
Roosevelt "I owe my throne to God, my people, my army - and to you!" - meaning Britain
and the United States-^) not only marked the beginning of that monarch's personal rule,
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but, ironically enough, also marked the end of British predominance in great power
involvement in Iran, with the obvious exception of Gulf military security. From this point
on, the United States would replace Britain as the major Western power in the nation's
affairs.
C. UNITED STATES
Although there was some American business presence in Iran prior to World War n,
United States involvement really began with the occupation of that country in 1941.
Though normally considered a British-Soviet operation, American forces were also on the
ground, securing and operating the vital supply route to Soviet forces. With the British
contraction after the war, United States' involvement deepened, ranging from forcing the
Soviet withdrawal in 1946 to the overthrow of Mossadegh in 1953. With the latter event,
as stated above, Britain's role in Tehran's affairs was effectively taken over by America.
United States' interests in Iran was driven by two objectives, one strategic and one
economic - the containment of Soviet expansion and the flow of oil. To these ends
Mohammed Reza Shah was a willing accomplice, and he used fear of the Communist
threat and burgeoning oil revenues to consolidate his reign, build his military power and
reform Iran's economy and society. This trend reached its peak in the early 1970s, when
tho British withdrawal from the Gulf and American involvement in and subsequent
withdrawal from Vietnam resulted in the Nixon administration's "Twin Pillars" policy for
Gulf security, and soaring oil prices enabled the Shah to accelerate his already massive
investment in American-made weapon systems. This aspect of the relationship collapsed
with the 1979 revolution, and American policy has been trying to recover from the shock
ever since.
1. Origins of the U.S.-Iranian Alliance
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When Mohammed Reza Shah succeeded his father on the Peacock Throne in
1941. he found himself facing the same foreign policy problem that had plagued Iranian
rulers for over a century: that of countering intrusive British and Russian influence. The
fact that troops of these nations had ousted his father and occupied Iran served to magnify
the traditional problem considerably, the Tripartite Treaty of 1942 notwithstanding.
Accordingly, he attempted to apply a time-honored diplomatic solution, that of courting a
third power to counter the influence of the other two. This is exactly what Reza Shah had
done in the inter-war years, but his choice of Germany as a balancer cost him his throne.
However, the young Shah had a choice not previously available - the United States.
The U.S. was a relative newcomer to the Middle East, with no imperial aspirations
or colonial traditions, and a heritage of supporting independence. In fact, at President
Roosevelt's initiative, the Allied leaders issued a communique during the Tehran
conference reiterating their "desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Iran."^ Such factors made America attractive as a protector,
and the Shah began to seek U.S. support, primarily economic and military assistance.
Shortly after his accession and even before the favorable statement at the Tehran
conference, the Shah told the U.S. envoy to Iran that he "would be very happy to be an
airy of America. "•** Though the U.S. still considered Iran to be in Britain's sphere of
influence, the war had shattered America's isolationism and aid was forthcoming. During
the war this included an economic mission under Dr. .Arthur Millspaugh and the
assignment of Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf to organize the Imperial Gendarmerie. °
However, American involvement was not limited to strictly technical and economic
pursuits. When the Soviet delegate, Sergey Kavtaradze, tried to pressure Iran into granting
a sweeping oil concession in 1944, the U.S. government plainly stated its position. On
November 1, 1944, the American ambassador to Tehran stated that U.S. "policy in this
case is based on the American government's recognition of the sovereign right of an
independent nation such as Iran, acting in a non-discriminatory manner, to grant or
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withhold commercial concessions within its territory.' Though the support of sovereign
nations certainly was a consideration, it is possible that this position, taken late in the war
when Germany was nearly defeated, was the result of growing concerns over Soviet post-
war ambitions. If so, such concerns were borne out shortly after the war's end.
Following the war U.S. policy was primarily concerned with containing Soviet
expansion and continued support of independent nations. This policy, later to be given
expression in the Truman Doctrine, was given its first test by the Soviet's refusal to
withdraw their forces from Iran as agreed to in the aforementioned Anglo-Soviet-Iranian
Treaty, and by the separatist crises in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, where the Soviets had set
up puppet governments under their influence. Truman's "blunt message to Stalin"
threatening use of U.S. forces induced him to withdraw his troops and American support
was critical in putting down the two Communist-led republics. ° There was one other
dimension to Soviet dominance of Iran, that of yet another oil concession giving Moscow
control of all such resources discovered in northern Iran. Though sources differ on
whether Iranian Prime Minister Qavam was pressured into this agreement or he accepted it
as part of a broader political strategy which would nullify it after Soviet troop withdrawals,
they agree that American support was again critical in thwarting Moscow's ambitions.
Little more than a month before the Majlis overwhelmingly rejected the concession U.S.
Ambassador Allen stated, "Patriotic Iranians, when considering matters affecting their
national interest, may therefore rest assured that the American people will support fully
their freedom to make their own choice. 9
With Soviet incursion checked American policy was effectively in place and there
was little other U.S. interest in Iran. In fact, the Shah failed to obtain desired military
equipment from the United States and economic aid was only a fraction of that hoped
for. ° Britain and the Soviet Union still dominated the area commercially and militarily.
American involvement would have to await another crisis of international proportions.
This came with the oil nationalization movement in the early 1950s.
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U.S. statements regarding national self-determination were in line with sentiments
of the Iranian National Front political movement headed by Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh.
Largely a secular, educated, modern-oriented, middle class grouping, it also included
traditional bazaaris and clerical elements. While this alliance was united in opposition to
the Shah and foreign influence, it was divided on many other issues. Under pressure this
fragility became readily apparent.
Though the West tended to see the oil nationalization crisis in terms of economics,
to the Iranian Majlis and people it was a continuation of the struggle against foreign
domination. Total control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was not merely a matter of
gaining a greater share of oil revenues, but one of serf-determination and independence.
The choice for the Mossadegh government was submission to Britain or independence
from it. There were other aspects to the National Front's political agenda as well. These
included the idea that the Shah should reign as a constitutional monarch rather than rule
absolutely; the implementation of constitutional provisions for a council of religious leaders
to approve laws; and subordination of the military to civilian control. Since most of these
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were modem, liberal-nationalist ideas consistent with Western democracy, Mossadegh
perhaps had every right to expect American support for his government's policies.
However, he misread the deeper strategic reasons behind the previous U.S. policy of
support for self-determination.
At first the both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations did not try to
influence the crisis either way, merely offering to mediate the dispute. As the British
economic boycott hurt the Iranian economy and Mossadegh refused to compromise,
however, events in Tehran became radicalized. The Shah had been unable to replace
Mossadegh due to his popular support, who, sensing his own power, gained control of the
military, dissolved the Senate and obtained approval of his rule by decree for six months.
Soon the National Front began to dissolve in disunity, with Mossadegh losing support of
both the communist Tudeh Party and conservative traditionalists, who wanted him to adopt
a harder line. Mossadegh himself was unable to back down from his "moral" stance on
nationalization, but he was unable to rectify the deepening economic and political problems
brought about by the dispute.
The Eisenhower administration's involvement in finding a solution to the problem
was finally engaged early in 1953. It is important to note that it was not Iran's economic
troubles, the merit of the Iranian position based on self-determination, nor continued
British imperialistic obstinance that brought about Washington's participation, but the fear
that growing communist influence would eventually take over the country. This theory was
advanced by Mossadegh himself in attempting to gain U.S. support and was echoed by
Ambassador Henderson, who"feared that Iran ...was slipping under Russian control.' ^
With the admission that Mossadegh was unable to control events the clear choice for the
West became not one of Mossadegh or the Shah, but the Shah or a Communist takeover.
In other words, the Mossadegh government had to go. This was engineered by British and
.American intelligence and backed the pro-Shah Iranian military.
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Accordingly, the Mossadegh government was overthrown and the Shah was
reinstated with full powers as an absolute monarch. Mossadegh lost any hope of American
support despite modern nationalistic leanings and the right of self-determination, and due
almost exclusively to the fear of a Soviet-backed takeover. Thus support of independence
was less important than combatting Soviet expansion in the formulation of American
policy. As we shall see, this strategic dimension dominated U.S. -Iran relations for the next
quarter century.
2. Evolution of the Special Relationship
Following the ouster of Mossadegh in August, 1953 the Shah was free to pursue
his relationship with the United States by presenting Iran as a key player in the anti-
Soviet alliance. Due to Iran's strategic geographic importance Washington also desired that
nation's Western alignment. Accordingly, Tehran joined Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan and Britain
in the Baghdad Pact of 1955 (later CENTO). Although the U.S. was not a member,
America implicitly backed the organization and participated in several committees,
including the military one. Tehran did not feel this was sufficient and continued to press
for WTashington's full participation. Apparently, the Shah thought that full alliance status
was necessary to guarantee Iran's security and give him the military and economic
assistance he desired. However, the Eisenhower administration refused to get too deeply
involved and the best the Shah could obtain was limited economic and military aid and a
bilateral U.S. defense agreement (1959), which was also concluded with other CENTO
members under the Eisenhower doctrine.
The Shah never seemed satisfied, either with security guarantees or the amount of
aid received from the U.S. During the eleven years of official U.S. involvement in Iran
prior to Mossadegh's ouster, Tehran received only $25 million in loans and $16 million in
grants, though the Shah had requested far more. After the coup the Shah requested $300
million to assist Iran's shattered economy, but received only $45 million in emergency aid.
During the remainder of the Eisenhower administration, Washington sent over $600
million in economic and $4.5 million in military aid to Tehran. These were substantial
amounts for the time and were obviously considered sufficient by the U.S., but were not
deemed so by the Shah, particularly the limits on military assistance.
The aid issue reveals two important aspects to the U.S-Iran relationship. First is the
lack of reciprocity or accountability required of Tehran. Although technically U.S.
assistance was linked to economic reform and development programs by the Iranian
government, the issue was never pushed by the U.S., probably due to the "overall concern
with the military dimension of the alliance". As long as Iran stood firm in the vital
northern tier against the Soviet Union, positive nation-building steps were not a
requirement for aid. The second aspect is the Shah's seemingly insatiable appetite for U.S.
military and economic involvement in Iran. Although substantive aid was regularly
forthcoming, it never kept up with the Shah's demands. The reality is that the Shah relied
more on American assistance than positive political, economic or social reforms to uphold
his regime, and he regarded such assistance as key to his longevity. Conversely,
Washington realized that despite the important strategic dimension to the relationship, Iran
was far more dependent on the U.S. than the reverse, and prudently refused to grant the
Shah his exorbitant requests.
While somewhat contradictory, this dimension of United States' policy was actually
a fairly healthy balance and reflected the major concern with containment above all else.
While not concerned with internal development, the U.S. granted Iran enough aid to keep
it politically stable and loyal to the Western camp. Let us see how this dimension of U.S.
policy changed over the years.
The basic pattern of American security and economic assistance outlined above
underwent three major changes prior to the revolution. Unlike the Eisenhower
administration, President Kennedy refused the Shah military aid and insisted on linking
economic aid to domestic reforms. During the Shah's April, 1962 visit to Washington,
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Kennedy emphasized the necessity of "farther acceleration of economic development in
Iran". " He also believed that the military assistance program had only succeeded in
making the Iranian armed forces too large for internal security and too small to resist Soviet
invasion. Kennedy's position may have been influential in installing Ali Amini as Prime
Minister (1961-62), a reformist disliked by the Shah, and in the "White Revolution"
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program of social and economic reforms of 1963. ' This situation was short-lived,
however, for after Johnson came to office aid was not only restored but increased. In
return, though, the Shah had to accept a status of forces agreement with the U.S. This
program was violently opposed by nationalist and religious leaders, and the protests
resulted in the arrest and exile of the Ayatollah Khomeini.
Johnson himself instituted the second change, but for different reasons. U.S.
economic assistance to Iran was terminated in 1 967, partially due to Iran's impressive
economic progress, but also because of the increasing financial and political costs of the
Vietnam War. At this time, however, the Shah's regime was sustainable without foreign
aid. Iran had experienced impressive, if somewhat unbalanced, economic growth and the
Shah had thoroughly consolidated political control. Therefore, the U.S. did not relinquish
an influential tool in cutting aid. This was the first sign that the "dependence factor" was
turning in Iran's favor. The events of the next few years would bear this out. America's
deepening troubles in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli and Indo-Pakistani wars, the British
withdrawal from "east of Suez", and increasing Soviet influence in the Middle East and
South Asia all combined to make the United States more dependent on Iran's military and
political support.
The impact of the international situation on American foreign policy was realized
by the Nixon doctrine, which stated that "in cases involving other types (non-nuclear
power) of aggression, (the U.S.) shall furnish military and economic assistance" but would
expect the threatened nation "to assume the primary responsibility of providing the
manpower for its defense." 50 During a stop in Tehran on his return from Moscow in
37
May, 1972, President Nixon applied the doctrine specifically to Iran. There he agreed to
sell America's most sophisticated combat aircraft to the Shah and added that "in the future
Iranian requests (for weapons) should not be second-guessed" This decision coincided
with the rise in oil prices which had begun, albeit slowly, even before the 1973 embargo.
The subsequent explosion in oil prices, along with relatively impressive industrialization and
blanket approval for U.S. weapons purchases, gave the Shah the ability to exercise the
authority and undertake the sort of military build up he had wanted all along.
Thus, the issue of U.S. arms sales to Iran, and essentially the complete direction of
U.S. policy toward that nation, were entrusted to no one's judgment but the Shah's. Far
from keeping Iran as a dependent but willing ally, this twist of policy made the United
States dependent on Iran for the security and stability of the entire region. Perhaps this is
best expressed by Nixon's own statement to the Shah at their 1 972 meeting in Tehran -
"Protect me."52
As Tehran's military inventory and industrial technology grew, so did its
dependence on Western - primarily American - workers and advisors. The burgeoning
influence of Western, secular culture, rapid modernization and urbanization incorporating
WTestern values, and the fact that the Shah was installed and supported by America and
Britain led to a tremendous loss of regime legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian people. The
almost total divorce of the ruling elite from any kind of traditional value system and the
pervasiveness of Western society was seen as a much greater danger to Persian culture and
Islamic values, than any overt political-military threat such as the Soviet Union. Thus,
America was viewed as an intruder on Iranian sovereignty and a great contributor to Iran's
domestic ills. Although internationally Tehran's strength was at a high point - a veritable
"island of stability" in the troubled Middle East5^ - the corruption, repression and
illegitimacy of the regime coupled with a sense of pervasive American control served to
heighten the "inferior, xenophobic" side of Iranian national character. Whether justifiable
or not, the United States became a perfect target for the extreme anti-foreign rhetoric of
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the revolutionary opposition. Though the Twin Pillars security structure served .American
intorcsts well at the time, the structure collapsed in less than a decade, as the Shah was not
able to ensure even Iran's own internal stability. America's short-sighted over-reliance on
an absolute monarch and lack of regard for the development of the Iranian nation as a
whole gradually became institutionalized during the quarter-century of the U.S. -Iran
relationship. This outlook found its ultimate manifestation in Nixon's "blank check" to the
Shah, and would prove to be one of the greatest challenges for U.S. policy-makers to
overcome in understanding and dealing with the revolutionary forces. The events of 1978-
1979 thus brought to an end nearly forty years of U.S. -Iranian alliance and unchallenged
.American domination of the region. It is this drastic change that American foreign policy
has unsuccessfully grappled with ever since.
3. America and the Islamic Republic
The United States was set inexorably at odds with Iran by the traumatic events of
1978-79. The sudden loss of the one of the "twin pillars" and the attendant American
strategic presence there, the international humiliation of the prolonged hostage crisis and
the anti-American fervor of the revolutionary regime were shocking and inexplicable to
both American policy-makers and the population at large. Coupled with the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, these events marked a major U.S. policy failure and loss of
prestige. While American interests in the region were affirmed by the Carter Doctrine, the
Reagan Corollary and the formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force,
implementation of these steps was not immediate and manifestations of recovery were
slow. Two major events have marked America's turbulent relations with Iran since the
revolution - the Hostage Crisis and the Iran-Iraq War.
a. The Hostage Crisis
The course of United States-Iran relations has been inexorably shaped by the
U.S. embassy hostage crisis. After the tumult of the revolution the United States did not
abandon its interests in or relations with Iran. While it was obvious that Tehran no longer
intended to play the role of an American client in the region, and although anti-American
sentiment ran high in much of Iran, there had been no move by either state to break
diplomatic or commercial relations. As revolutionary tension eased somewhat relations
returned to a relatively normal condition.
This changed dramatically with the capture of the American Embassy on
November 4, 1979 by a group of militant university students. Though the motives of
various political groupings involved in this episode are not entirely clear, it is clear that the
clerical regime headed by Khomeini exploited the situation for their own domestic political
ends. It was well understood by both the Carter administration and different factions in
Tehran that the hostage taking was used to polarize the positions of both the United States
and Iran and enable Khomeini to consolidate his hold on power and put the structure of an
Islamic government in place.
While the hostage crisis was manipulated effectively to serve Khomeini's
purposes, it has placed a major stumbling block between the two nations. Americans will
not soon forget the humiliation of having U.S. citizens held against their will and being
incapable of attaining their release. Similarly, Iranians have paid a high price since then for
the international isolation placed on their country, much of it in response to and
remembrance of their blatant flouting of international norms of behavior. While this is well
understood, it must be realized that there was far more damage done to American strategic
interests by the revolution and the attendant collapse of the Iranian-backed security system
in the Gulf than by the hostage crisis itself. It should also be noted that, in spite of the
profound international humiliation experienced by the U.S., all Americans were released
alive and in good health. Conversely, many American lives have been lost in other, less
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well-remembered events, such as the sinking of the USS Liberty, the attack on the US
S
Stark and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. Yet the intractability and length
of the hostage's ordeal and the unprecedented media coverage it received have made it a
major obstacle to anything approaching open relations since then.
b. The Iran-Iraq War
Of vastly greater importance to Gulf security and America's interests was the
eight year Iran-Iraq War, which began only twenty months after the Shah's ouster. At the
time of the Iraqi invasion, the revolutionary government was still preoccupied with
domestic problems, including economic trouble, consolidation of power and armed
rebellion, so that any comprehensive foreign policy had yet to be formed. However,
personal animosity between Khomeini and Hussein only served to heighten perennial
border disputes, ideological differences and ethnic hatreds, and hasten the slide to war.
Racked with internal dissent and without the superpower backing enjoyed by the Shah,
Iran must have seemed an easy target for the militarized Baathist regime. Inexorably
distanced by Tehran's radical stance, many Western and conservative Arab states quickly, if
not openly, lined up behind Baghdad's offensive. A major shift in the regional balance of
power took place as once radical Iraq looked safe and stable compared to Khomeini, the
urban street mobs and the Revolutionary Guards.
The United States tried to remain neutral regarding the conflict at first. As did
the Soviets, however, the U.S. soon realized that a decisive victory by either warring state
would be detrimental and sought to balance the two out, supporting Iraq with intelligence
and financial aid, while secretly supplying Iran with arms. (Additionally, Israel also
supplied Tehran with military equipment and parts, either with or without Washington's
approval.^) Beginning in late 1983, after notification of Iraq's economic troubles,
Washington tilted increasingly toward Baghdad, normalizing relations in 1984.
6 After the
disclosure of the Iran-Contra arms dealings, the U.S. tilt toward Iraq was more open and
increasingly pronounced, as evidenced by Washington's delicate handling of the Iraqi attack
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on the USS Stark, the Kuwaiti tanker re-flagging, escort, and minesweeping operations,
and several small skirmishes with Iranian naval forces and the destruction of Iranian oil
platforms. Additionally, this naval involvement showed Tehran that it could not hope to
win the "tanker war" and continue economically in the face of Iraqi offensives on the
ground. This pressure contributed greatly to Tehran's acceptance of a cease fire based on
UN Resolution 598. While American military involvement was necessary to safeguard
Arab allies, and guarantee the flow of oil and safe navigation of the Gulf, these actions
served to further increase the gap between Washington and Tehran.
c. Post-War Relations 1988-1990
The cease fire agreement of August, 1988 and non-implementation of
Resolution 598 left Iran greatly weakened. Iraqi troops remained on Iranian soil and
Iranian power in the Gulf had been displaced by the U.S. Navy. Furthermore, the
decreasing Soviet threat put Iran in a seemingly unimportant position strategically. Thus,
the United States continued its support of Saddam Hussein and the GCC. "The Western
position toward Iran in this period was that Iran had nowhere else to go and that if the
WTest stood firm, Iran would accept all its conditions and normalize ties on Western
terms."-5 ' Indeed, Iran also saw things this way. They badly needed Western capital and
technical assistance to rebuild the war-damaged nation. Tehran began to pursue a policy of
opening to the West. However, the West saw no need to help Iran due to improving East-
West relations and viewed the Arab side of the Gulf as more important. Additionally,
radical elements in Iran undermined the more moderate factions through rhetoric and terror
tactics, thus ensuring a negative response by the West. Finally, in early 1989, the Rushdie
affair, in which Khomeini issued a fetwa condemning the author to death as an apostate,
thoroughly alienated the West, especially Britain. * Despite some opportunities for an
opening of relations, the situation remained a standoff until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
As can be seen from the events related above, Khomeini's rigid ideological
stance of "neither East or West" and radical "Islamic" expansionism, albeit with limited
resources for the most part, alienated the United States, increasingly isolated Iran from the
international community and at least contributed to the country's involvement in a
devastating eight year long war, much to its detriment.
Similarly, the inability of Washington to deal effectively with the many crises of
the decade and the increasingly close relationship forged with the GCC states highlight
U.S. differences with the radical Tehran government and the need for a comprehensive
strategy based on real, mutual interests rather than ideological conflict.
In examining the relations of Iran with the great powers, some pertinent facts
become clear. First, however important economic interests were to Russia, Britain and the
United States, larger strategic concerns have always headed the list of interests regarding
Iran. Although strategic and economic concerns are more closely interwoven today,
strategic interests still predominate. Second, Iran has not itself been the prize of the great
powers, but simply a means to an end, whether that was access to warm water ports,
protection of imperial communications, or a barrier to Soviet expansion and pillar of Gulf
security. This was especially true of Britain and the U.S. with their maritime view of
international relations. Similarly, current U.S. interests should not focus merely on defense
of the oil reserves or on political conflict with Tehran, but on the important role which Iran
can play in promoting the stability of the region. Finally, though long the most powerful
regional state with legitimate and even hegemonic aims of its own, Iran has been able to
accomplish little in the face of great power involvement. As long as American military
power remains dominant and the U.S. pursues its broader strategic interests in Southwest
Asia, Iran should not be viewed as simply a threat to dealt with.
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VI. REVOLUTIONARY IRAN
A. CHALLENGE IN THE GULF
The 1979 Iranian Revolution was a watershed event in Middle East history and world
affairs in general. Of course there had been previous "revolutions" in the Muslim world,
but these mainly took the form of military coups d'etat or other cases of elite groups seizing
the center of power. The Iranian case is one of the few instances of a successful, broad-
based popular revolution which attempted to thoroughly transform society. More
significantly, it marked the formation of an Islamic government and a theocratic state, one
which arose through violent means and espoused a radical ideology. As such, it posed a
very real threat to the rest of the Muslim world and the West.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, as the personification of the new regime's character, did
not confine his extreme ideological stance to domestic issues, but carried them into the
foreign policy arena as well. His hostile, anti-foreign - and especially anti-American -
rhetoric, though couched in Islamic terms, had deep nationalistic roots. While the general
foreign policy goal of unchallenged Iranian dominance was basically the same, Khomeini's
international dealings were much more confrontational than the Shah's. If anything,
revolutionary Iran was even more expansionist than that of the "imperial" Pahlavis. Thus,
the Islamic revolution changed the nature of the objectives and the methods employed, but
not the objectives themselves.
In order to understand the future direction of Iran and its relations with the United
States under the Islamic Republic, there must be an understanding of several factors. Key
ones discussed below are the ruling ideology, military role and capabilities, the state of the
economy and the political situation, both domestically and internationally.
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B. ISLAM AS IDEOLOGY
1. Shiism and Government in Iran
Since a major factor in Gulf security is the existence of a theocracy based on a
radical interpretation of Islam and the confrontational rhetoric which that regime espouses,
it is necessary to thoroughly understand this ideology and its role in the Iranian system of
government. Only with a working knowledge of this system can we assess its prospects for
survival, stability, or moderation.
There are "five critical political factors which have... left their impact on Iranian
politics... the monarchy, oil, foreign powers, ideologies, and Islam. " While Hussein
correctly separates the religion of Islam from secular ideologies, the ideology of the Iranian
revolution was based on Shia Islam. It is this transformation of religion into a powerful
political force and the emergence of religious leaders into political actors that form the
central theme of the revolution. In order to understand the current Tehran government it is
first necessary to understand how Twelver Shiism is used in Iranian politics.
Shiites are traditionally seen as a suppressed yet militant sect, much more radical
than the more numerous Sunnis. In reality, however, it has been a passive religion which
purposely avoided involvement in politics. This is primarily due to the belief in the hidden
twelfth Imam. In the Imamate concept
all sovereignty ... was vested in God. In other words... the Imam merely ruled on
behalf of God. Power was not concentrated in the
hands of men to rule as they pleased. The people could judge the ruler according to the
standards prescribed in the Koran. °
Since no Imam except Ali ever gained political power, they became primarily religious
leaders with an unrealized political role, a tradition which they passed on to their followers.
Both activist and quietist attitudes to prevailing authority could be deduced from the
Imami belief, but it is clear that the latter came gradually to dominate the mainstream of
Shiism...Insofar as any attitude to the state and authority can be deduced from the
teachings of the Imams, it is one that combines a denial of legitimacy with a quietistic
patience and abstention from action. l
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In the absence of any present Imam the Shia community looked to the religious jurists
{mujtahids) for guidance. Traditionally the clergy's role remained religious and non-
political, often implementing the principle of dissimulation (taqiyah) to avoid danger to
themselves or the community, This principle of submissiveness, combined with the
doctrines and teachings of the Imams,
intensified the essentially quietist position of Imami Shiism with regard to worldly
authority...the [doctrines of occultation] can be regarded as justifying a de facto
acceptance of the existing regime. Those who believe in the hidden Imam are not
required to do anything in the immediate future, not even to work for any particular
reform. At the same time it is implied that the regime is not perfect, and the way is left
open for action at some future date...A change of circumstances might suggest to the
adherents of the movement that the time for action had come.
In spite of this quiescent attitude, the ulama occasionally exercised their influence to oppose
social injustice and uphold the precepts of the Koran. As we shall see, this activist
tendency of a minority of the clergy came to the fore during the revolution.
Shah Ismail, founder of the Safavid dynasty, declared Shiism the official state
religion and
gave birth to something like an official clergy, exclusively concerned with legality and
jurisprudence, to such a point that original Shiism (had) to hide itself. The body of
ulama that emerged in Safavid times came in effect to partake of the charisma and auth-
ority of the Imams, but as Shiism denies legitimate authority to worldly power, so too, no
/TO
authority in the strict sense of the term resided in the ulama. J
Even so, the power granted Shiism in the Safavid state could work against the monarchy
by politicizing the clergy. In fact, since Shiism by definition does not recognize legitimate
rule by man, the establishment of it as a state religion necessitates a continual conflict
between clergy and state, thus causing the Safavid and later Iranian dynasties to be plagued
by "the necessary and inescapable illegitimacy of the state."
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2. Politicization of the I lama
Both political and religious developments during the Qajar period favored increased
political activism by the clergy. Unlike the Safavids, the Qajars did not co-opt the religious
element and so left a relatively powerful clergy independent of the state. Additionally, the
clergy was split on religious issues. The Usuli school of thought, which held that a
mujtahid could exercise interpretation {ijtihad) in the absence of the Imam, became
dominant over the Akbari school, which rejected ijtihad. The Usulis believed that the
Muslim community was divided into mujtahids and those unlearned in religious law
(muqallids), and that the latter must follow the former,
for the former's whole life had passed in the comprehension of Islamic law and his
ijtihad was therefore valid. Since muqallids do not have the necessary power of
comprehension of the law and independent reasoning to attain that state, they must of
necessity follow the guidance of one who is (a mujtahid).
Since ijtihad was matter of interpretation and reasoning, and the result was merely personal
opinion, no mujtahid was viewed as infallible.
Thus, to accept the pronouncements of any one mujtahid is not... obligatory, for the
mujtahid may claim no infallibility and mujtahids will vary in their opinions and rulings.
What is obligatory is the principle of following the direction of a certain mujtahid in order
to ensure some continuity of authority.
Here is illustrated the principle of emulation (taqlid) and the basis for the position of
Marja e Taqlid, those clerics recognized as the leading Shiite jurists and scholars. Such
thoughts as these opened the door to politicization of the clergy and legitimized their
leadership of the masses vice that of the secular rulers.
By the late nineteenth century, then, both the political and religious landscapes were
set for activation of the clergy. This occurred most notably during the Tobacco Protest of
1892 and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909. Important results of these episodes
were that the ulama proved capable of challenging the government, they received the
unqualified support of the masses, and they solidified their links to the bazaaris and other
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influential elements of traditional society. It was also significant that the clergy did not lead
the opposition alone, but cooperated with secular liberal-nationalist elites. This coalition
would surface again during the Mossadegh era and it was these actions which laid the basis
for the revolution of 1978-79.
3. Khomeini's Ideology
One of the clerics who became heir to the traditions of social protest was Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, the man who would emerge as the ideological leader of the revolution
and undisputed master of the post-revolutionary regime. The son and grandson of
religious scholars, he became a student and then a teacher in the centers of Shiite learning
in the holy city of Qom. His early development as a scholar coincided with Reza Khan's
rise to power and his subsequent and often brutal suppression of the Ulama.
These events left a deep and lasting mark on Khomeini. His speeches and declarations
in the 1960s and 1970s are sprinkled with references to the humiliation suffered by the
ulama and the willful denigration to which Islam was subjected under Reza Shah. This
partly explains Khomeini's sensitivity and opposition to ...Mohammed Reza Shah. '
According to Ayatollah Mohammed-Javad Bahonar, a student and later colleague, even as
a young teacher,
he interpreted Islam as a commitment to social and political causes...the two issues he
emphasized were the necessity for Islam and Iran to be independent of both Eastern and
Western colonialism and the need to get the clerics out of the mold of an academic
fro
straight jacket.00
It is apparent from this that Khomeini was inclined early in his career to a radical stance.
During this period the main focus of his lectures was ethics, and his preaching began to
draw large crowds, particularly from the seminary students of Qom. This drew the
attention of the government and the seminary (madrassa) at which he taught was closed.
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Though he continued writing and lecturing in this vein, his actions remained
apolitical through the protests of the 1940s and 1950s. This was probably due to the
influence of the leading Marja e Taqlid, Ayatollah Borujerdi, who prevented the ulama
from taking part in politics. Only after Borujerdi's death in 1961 did Khomeini transform
his thoughts into action, becoming a leader of the opposition to the Shah's "White
Revolution" reform program in 1963. He saw the reforms - ranging from land distribution
and educational programs to granting women the right to vote - as a threat to the ulama and
Islam. Khomeini denounced the reforms repeatedly and anti-government feelings ran high
in major cities. After an attack by the army on his Faiziyyeh madrassa in Qom he preached
against the government, saying "love of the Shah means...violation of the rights of Muslims
and violation of the commandments of Islam. ""^ Matters reached a head in June, 1963,
the month of Moharram. Khomeini delivered a sermon on Ashura in which he directly
attacked the Shah, one which raised anti-government sentiment in many cities and for
which he was quickly arrested and imprisoned. Later released, he was arrested again the
following year for protesting the status of forces agreements with the United States, and
later exiled.
Most of his fifteen years in exile was spent in Najaf, Iraq. It was here, through
sermons, writings and declarations, that he developed his revolutionary ideology. This
culminated in "Islamic Government"70, a series of lectures and writings on the
establishment of an Islamic state. In it he continually attacked the Jews, Zionism,
colonialism, secularism, the West, the East, and of course the Shah, entities for which he
blamed the troubles of Islam and Iran. He upheld Islam as a political religion which could
not be separated from the running of state and society, and which held the cure to all of
society's ills. He denigrated the traditions which had made Islam a passive religion that
stayed out of politics. He argued that Islamic law was not harsh but just. He legitimized
the need for an Islamically-based government and the method of its establishment, and
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exhorted the people to revolution. Most significantly, and most radically, he put forth the
concept of "velayat e faqih", the governance of the jurisprudent, which stated that Islam
required a just guide to implement its laws and to watch over society so that it did not
become corrupt.
Some of the more salient points of "Islamic Government" are excerpted below.
Is there monarchy, hereditary rule, or succession to the throne in Islam? How can this
happen when the monarchic rule is in conflict with Islamic rule and with the Islamic
political system, p. 9.
In truth social laws and regulations require an executor. This is why Islam decided to
establish an executive authority side by side with the legislative authority and appointed a
person in charge to implement, in addition to teaching, educating and explaining, p. 18.
...rebel against and fight the rule of false gods...We have no alternative but to work to
destroy the corrupt and corrupting systems and to destroy the symbol of treason and the
unjust among the rulers of the peoples. This is a duty that all Muslims wherever they
may be are entrusted - a duty to create a victorious and triumphant Islamic political
revolution, p. 26.
The Islamic government... is not a despotic government in which the head of state
dictates his opinion and tampers with the lives and property of the people. It is
constitutional in the sense that those in charge of affairs observe the dictates and laws of
Islam, p. 31.
If a knowledgeable and just jurisprudent undertakes the task of forming the government,
then he will run the social affairs that the prophet used to run and it is a duty of the
people to listen to him and obey him. p. 37.
With these ideas Khomeini put forth his concept of an Islamic theocracy. This
document contained everything needed for a successful revolutionary ideology. It
identified those responsible for Iran's present condition, held forth an alternative model for
success, linked this model to society and laid out the method of implementing it. Khomeini
goes to great lengths to justify not only the need for a state based solely on Islam, but also
for the need for an executor to administer this system. He has no qualms about expressing
his opinion on who is qualified to lead the Muslim community and why the "just
jurisprudent" must be obeyed.
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Khomeini's work is filled with contradictions. Since Islam is the "right path" which
provides happiness in all aspects of life, all Muslims willingly follow the Sharia without
question or straying. Yet they are also incapable of avoiding corruption and self-
indulgence, so that there must be a guide appointed over them as a guardian over orphans.
He rails against the corrupt practices of hypocritical leaders intent on exploitation and
personal gain, against the constitutional systems which make leaders answerable to the
people. Yet he seeks realization of a government in which one man is answerable only to
God. Seemingly, the qualifications required of the faqih would make him incorruptible in
the face of the pressures of possessing absolute power over an entire nation. Finally the
premise of the velayat e faqih was a radical departure from traditional Shiism and a
contradiction of the basis of the Shiite faith itself.
Khomeini's political position is not just a restatement of any past important line of
thought in shiism...before 1905 no ulama argued for constitutions and before Khomeini,
whatever the claims of some ulama to greater legitimacy than kings, none argued that
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kings should not exist and ulama should rule Iran directly.
Antoun continues,
...we must conclude that there has been considerable change in (Shia) religious ideology
from a belief in the non-necessity of following the consensus of mujtahids to the belief
that one must follow them in law to the belief that has evolved in our own time that they
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should be followed in government.
While extreme from a religious perspective, especially in regard to Shiism's
traditions of taqiyah and taqlid, the velayat e faqih can be seen as a logical offshoot of this
faith, albeit one for purely political purposes. The Usuli concept of the division of
humanity into mujtahid and muqallid, and the necessity for the latter to follow the dictates
of the former, was transformed from the religious to the political realm and brought to its
logical, but radical conclusion. Khomeini "presupposes the transformation of Shiism from
a reHgjo-political tradition into a revolutionary ideology" which "advocates, in fact, a radical
departure from Shii tradition under the guise radical traditionalism."
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Though there were other leading ideologues with their own interpretations of Islam
as it related to modern Iran and opposition to the Pahlavi regime, none attained the
dominant position of Khomeini. His brand of Islam appealed particularly to the religiously
inclined masses and seminary students. Though a scholar, his education was strictly
traditional and his works were in a populist vein which appealed to the common man.
While in exile, he maintained contacts to Iranian clergy and society and was much more "in
touch" than the societalfy rootless Pahlavis. Communicated through a network of ulama
and religious associations to the mosques and schools, his sermons and writings reached a
vast number of Iranians. They hammered at the same themes over and over until they
were legitimized by sheer repetition. As social, economic and political conditions polarized
the population during the 1970s his ideology became increasingly pertinent. In search of a
leader, the Islamically-minded masses rejected the secular elites, leftist extremists and
apolitical clergy and turned to Khomeini as the most constant voice of opposition who held
out what they perceived as a real solution to their problems. It was his appeal to the mass
urban poor which formed the broad base of Khomeini's strength during the revolution and
the factional power struggles which followed.
4. Implementation of Ideology: Successes and Failures
Tehran's two major ideological successes since the revolution have been the
Islamicization of the military and the institutionalization of the Revolutionary Guards
(Pasdaran-e Enqelab). In a notably pragmatic move, the initial purges of the Imperial
Iranian Armed Forces only targeted top officers who supported the Shah. Later, however,
the purges were aimed at "ideological purification of military personnel at all levels." '^
Although this was primarily due to the failed U.S. hostage rescue attempt, abortive military
coups and a desire to eliminate class barriers between officers and enlisted men, it was also
due to the radical views of Defense Minister Mustafa Chamran. These purges were done
under the banner of Tslamicization and the constitution, which calls for a doctrinaire
military. "In creating our defense forces, religious faith and adherence to religious
doctrines should be the principal criteria for recruitment of personnel in the military."
Along with the purification of the militarv, the Pasdaran had been institutionalized
as the "eyes and ears of the revolution."76 Elevated to a ministerial position and
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numbering 250,000 by 1988, ' ' their duties range from internal police and security
functions to external defense. As such, they have become a coercive and stabilizing arm of
the regime and a major manifestation of the importance of ideology in continuing the
revolution.
Working with the Pasdaran is the Mobilization of the Oppressed {Basij-e
Mustazqfiri). The teenage members of this militia "are volunteers ...from families with
78deep religious sentiments and unmitigated supported for the Islamic Republic." This
organization not only mobilizes a large part of the poorer population against an external
threat, but has the added political advantage of cementing the religious sentiments of the
masses to the Islamic regime.
The major ideological dimension of the Islamic indoctrination of the military is the
solidification of morale. Despite the loss of senior leadership and lack of outside support,
the upsurge of morale and unity of purpose of the post-revolutionary Iranian military
proved to be the difference on the battlefield against Iraq's technologically superior forces.
"...the central issue is the willingness of the troops to fight, their belief in their cause and
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their confidence in their officers.'" 7
If ideological changes in the armed forces were largely successful, the contradiction
can be found in domestic policies. Like Islamic government, Islamic economics was
supposed to be a third way, neither East nor West, neither capitalism nor communism,
based on the precepts of the Koran. Yet ideological principles did not translate well into
real-world practice. For instance, under the Shah religious taxes were voluntary in nature.
In the Islamic Republic, however, religious taxes were to be the sole source of government
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revenue. When these did not prove sufficient, secular taxes were imposed also, thus
creating an unpopular dual tax burden. Yet "taxation is the right of the Islamic
government" which should "make the payments of taxes an Islamic duty for the
people."80
Though much personal property and real estate was confiscated during the early
days of the revolution, re-distribution of wealth since then has stagnated. Land reform bills
passed by the Majlis have been repeatedly canceled by the more traditional Council of
Guardians, the clerical group charged with defending the constitution and vetoing non-
Islamic laws. Though partially due to philosophical beliefs, there are also political
reasons for this stance. The ulama are traditionally one of the largest landholding groups in
Iran, and they draw their political and financial support from these holdings and from the
mass poor. Thus "any radical measures which would result in the elimination of this
process (extraction and distribution of religious taxes), either by eradicating poverty or by
the state taking over taxation and welfare provisions, would in fact erode the most vital
links between the religious establishment and its support base. z Doctrinal differences on
personal property and political factionalism similarly blocked any concerted economic
development programs.
A final ideological failure was the denigration of Iranian nationalism. Since the
Pahlavi dynasty had placed monarchy and nation above all else and ignored any
identification with Islam, the revolutionary government did just the opposite. Everything
was expressed in terms of Islam and the Muslim world, with little mention of the Iranian
nation or Iran's national interests. This was true not only in the domestic arena but was
particularly apparent in such foreign policy initiatives as the export of revolution. Attacks
on Iranian nationalism and foreign policies which were not in Iran's national interests hurt
the country greatly through the 1980s by alienating it from the rest of the world.
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However, tliis could not last. Restive ethnic minorities and the Iraqi invasion in
1980 forced the government to return to support of Iranian nationalism. The strength of
this nationalism was illustrated by the actions of most of the population in support of the
war effort, particularly the Arabs of Khuzistan. Although not on the same level with Islam,
nationalism was also greatly responsible for an effective war effort and is alive and well
today. The revolutionary regime found that it was no more possible to separate a people
with such a long and proud history and culture from their nationalism than it was to
separate them from their religion. In this the Islamic Republic was as mistaken as were the
Pahlavi monarches.
The inability to create a comprehensive development plan, failure of Islamic taxes
to provide sufficient revenue and the refusal to implement meaningful land reform have
effectively broken the promises of the pre-revolutionary rhetoric to care for the poor and
oppressed. Additionally, the denigration of Iranian nationalism alienated many supporters
and cost the government much needed legitimacy and military effectiveness in the early
days of the revolution and the war with Iraq. More importantly, these failures illustrate the
contradictions inherent in the ideological framework of an Islamic state.
5. Political Contradictions
As detailed above, the greatest contradiction of Iran's political system is the very
existence of a Shiite theocracy. Since by definition Shiism does not recognize the rule of
man as legitimate, the establishment of Shiite Islam as not merely a state religion but a
governing ideology is itself contradictory and illogical. A system wherein the clergy
exercise secular authority makes religion inseparable from the state. This factor alone
mitigates the position of the clergy who put the system into effect. Traditionally,
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the Shia establishment has exerted tremendous political influence without incurring any
responsibility or blame, while maintaining its position as the guardian of religious
purity...But being in charge of running the government, the clergy cannot escape popular
blame for its deficiencies. Moreover, government failure undermines popular belief in
the religious principles used... as the basis and justification for its policies, thus weakening
the hold of religion in the society and by extension the clergy's influence. 3
Thus it can be seen that if the Shiite sect in particular practices interpretation and
that the interpretations of any credible religious scholar are valid, Khomeini's own radical
interpretations of Islam are not necessarily universally accepted. This is in fact the case. It
is due to this factor more than any other that the Islamic government stands to lose
legitimacy with its own people and must seek modification and eventually moderation.
A second, related contradiction is also significant. This is the concept of velayat-e
faqih. Obviously, for an individual to be a nation's supreme religious leader and its political
ruler, such an individual would have to possess unique qualities and credentials of both
political and religious leadership. Although Khomeini possessed sufficient religious
credentials to be a source of emulation, he became Iran's political ruler not for this reason
but because of his leadership of the revolution. The concept of velayat-e faqih was
instituted in the 1979 constitution to provide a legal basis for Khomeini's undisputed
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rule. However, the requirement that the faqih be a source of emulation (Marja-e
Taqlid) presented problems for choosing a successor to Khomeini. Due to the non-
systematic method of a mujtahid becoming a Marja and the necessity of choosing a
successor with both spiritual credentials and political abilities, changes in the constitution
had to be made. The result was the deletion of the "emulation requirement" so that a
politically able and acceptable successor could be named. This action
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separated the functions of leadership from being a source of emulation... the
constitutional amendment stripped the office of the supreme religious leader and the
selection process of religious consideration and made it even more of a political office
than it was before.
This is a key example of the revolutionary government's willingness to moderate its radical
ideological stance in the face of political realities.
After consolidating all power in the hands of the radical ulama and their
revolutionary institutions, crushing any opposition and re-molding Iranian society, the
government of Iran has gradually had to moderate its stance and deal with the realities of a
world of nation-states. This has not been done completely, however, because of the need
to continue ideological symbolism in order to legitimize the post-revolutionary regime. The
government was unable to reconcile the orthodox clergy, and had to change economic
policies to keep from alienating one of their most important support elements, the
traditional merchant class. The extremist Islam which fired the revolution was unable not
only to find a consensus in the Muslim world, but also to forge an enduring unity of the
Iranian people. Consequently, it will have to bow to even more constant and enduring
factors, Iranian culture and nationalism.
The continuing political conflicts and contradictory policies of Iran hjttfilight the
difficulties which the Islamic ideology has in governing. It was, however, essential to a
successful revolution. As the only available cross-class ideology, a politicized Shiism was
necessary to unite opposition elements and provide the belief system which mobilized the
population against the Shah. However, once in power, the ideology has proven hollow.
Whatever their original intent, Khomeini and his circle of radical clergy did what was
necessary to consolidate their power and impose their particular brand of Islam on the
nation. The only ideological successes have come in relation to armed conflict, for it takes
more than political realities and material considerations to induce men to die. Aside from
this, it could not unite the nation politically or deal with economic problems. Though
Shiism is nearly universal in Iran, it is neither hegemonic nor monolithic.
Thus, the adaptation of hegemonic Islam as the new state's ideology...resulted
unavoidably in inter-class and intra-class struggles. These initially intense conflicts have
become more moderate over time as hegemonic Islam has eliminated many rivals and
allowed for a more liberal and pragmatic interpretation of its tenets. 00
The contradictions of the Islamic state are the same ones inherent in Shiism itself, but their
impacts are magnified when religion controls the government. The populist, egalitarian
rhetoric of the revolution succumbed to class distinction and political realities, with the
radical ulama on top. In vesting all power in one man, answerable only to God, the Iranian
people merely traded one despot for another. Similarly, though the ideological symbolism
stayed the same, its substance changed from one of freedom and equality to one of conflict
and oppression. While Khomeini's Islam was both essential and successful in revolt, it has
proven too extreme, contradictory and unrealistic to be successful in governing. These
problems and contradictions are the underlying reasons which will force the Tehran
government to moderate both its domestic and foreign policies.
C. ARMED FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
Since a nation's armed forces are both the ultimate political tool of that nation and a
primary factor in its political fortunes, it is logical to assume that the history of these forces
mirrors that of the nation itself. Such is the case with Iran. The strength of its military has
both contributed to and resulted from Iran's existing political situation, whether that was the
triumphs of the Achaemenid dynasty and Nadir Shah or the humiliation of conquest by
Mongols or Russians. However, certain periods of Persian ascendancy have not depended
on military might, such as the dominance of Persian culture and government under the
Abbasid caliphs or the overthrow of Mohammed Reza Shah. In fact, since the decline of
the Safavid Empire military force has rarely been the major factor in the Persian state.
Even when the army has been predominant under a strong ruler, its power has proven to
be short-lived and deceptively fragile. Thus, the dual nature of Iran is also reflected in its
military history. While the Iranian military is extremely important both from a historical
perspective and as a part of the modern nation-state, unlike in other Middle East nations it
is not the dominant actor as either a pillar of the government or as a foreign policy tool.
1. The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces
One and one-half centuries after Nadir Shah's conquests, the corrupt Qajar dynasty
had effectively sold Persian sovereignty to outside powers. This included the army. The
only effective military units in the country were those established and trained by foreigners.
These were the Russian-controlled Persian Cossack Brigade, the British-run South Persia
Rifles, and the Swedish-officered Gendarmerie. In the political turmoil following World
War I and the Russian Revolution (which caused withdrawal of Russian forces from
Persia), Reza Khan became commander of the Cossack Brigade and in 1921 took over the
government in a military coup. Consolidating his power by 1925, he determined to make
Iran a modern, unified and independent nation. An important part of this plan, as well as
the base of his own political power, lay in a strong, well-trained and modern army. To this
end he had Iranian officers trained in European military academies, instituted universal
conscription and allocated 30-50% of the annual national budget to military
expenditures. By the advent of World War II the Iranian Army totalled 125,000
troops** ° and was the pillar of the regime, securing the new Pahlavi dynasty against both
external aggression and internal dissension.
Though ostensibly not its primary purpose, internal security was what Reza Shah's
army did best. It had virtually no experience in actual warfighting and collapsed when
faced with its first serious external challenge. Despite its size and apparently modern
equipment and training, the Iranian Army was easily defeated by occupying British and
Soviet forces in 1941 . Though faced with a vastly different sort of opposition,
Mohammed Reza Shah's military would similarly be exposed as a paper tiger by the
revolution.
Though replacing his father on the Peacock Throne after his abdication in 1941, it
took Mohammed Reza Shah more than a decade to consolidate his power, faced as he was
with foreign occupation and domestic political rivalries. His restoration to the throne and
Prime Minister Mossadegh's ouster in 1953 was due largely to loyal military elements and
Western support, and on these factors he continued to rely in building his vision of the
Iranian state.
The practice of a modernizing and privileged military class playing a central role in
the Tehran regime, begun by Reza Shah, accelerated rapidly under his son. With the
WTiite Revolution of 1963 the Iranian military played an increasing role in implementing
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these reforms and in government and society in general. The military was given
preferential social and financial treatment, and many high ranking officers served as
provincial governors, mayors of major cities and in important central government posts.
The Shah relied heavily on United States political, military and technical support in
building his military machine. With the rise in oil prices of the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the Shah was able to fund his own procurement and modernization programs, and was
given a free hand in this regard by implementation of the Nixon doctrine in 1972. By the
mid-1970s Iran possessed one of the most impressive armed forces in Southwest Asia, at
least in terms of equipment.
The primary aim of the Shah's military was defense against external aggression,
initially from the Soviet Union. Realizing the imbalance of forces facing him, "the Shah
pursued economic cooperation to improve relations with the Soviet Union and thereby
reduce military tensions along the border. * With this threat somewhat abated, Tehran
faced the radical government in Baghdad and, increasingly, the vital Persian Gulf. With
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the British withdrawal in 1971, the Shah intended to play a major role in security there.
He steadily expanded Iran's military power throughout the decade, a factor which enabled
him to become the dominant political actor in the region. This favorable military balance
was exercised politically in securing the Algiers Accord with Iraq and participating in
CENTO maneuvers and UN peacekeeping operations, and militarily in fighting
insurgencies in Oman and Pakistan and in seizing strategic islands in the Gulf. In spite
of these actions, the Shah's armed forces were little challenged until the revolution.
The internal security challenge presented by the revolutionary forces proved to be
one which the professional military was unable to deal with, either militarily or politically.
While it can be argued that such a function is outside that of a regular military force, it can
also be said that the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces had internal regime security as a
function and should have been prepared to exercise in this role. Indeed, approximately
30% of the Shah's ground forces were stationed in Tehran itself. Also, as stated above,
many officers held important civil government posts. Additionally,
...the military also came to assume duties in the administration ofjustice. Whenever
internal opposition to the regime became serious, the Shah imposed martial law; but
even when civilian authority was reinstated, most political offenses continued to be
brought before military courts. By the mid-1970s the Shah had increased the jurisdiction
of the armed forces to the extent that even smugglers, drug pushers and currency forgers
were tried in military tribunals. 4
With such arrangements, the Shah's military commanders certainly knew their primary
mission, and in fact there were numerous uses of force against the revolutionary
demonstrators in 1978. Not only were these heavy-handed measures ineffective, but the
Iranian generals were ill-prepared for the burden the Shah would place on them as the
political crisis deepened. This failure can largely be traced to the organization and force
structure put in place by the Shah himself.
That monarch was in a paradoxical situation regarding the effectiveness of his
military organization. It constituted his only real base of political support and enforcement
of his policies, and was therefore required to be as well trained and equipped as possible.
Yet it also represented the major threat to his rule, so he went to great lengths to prevent
any possible opposition from his commanders. Although maneuver units were organized
along American lines, this example was not followed administratively. Instead of a joint
staff of service chiefs to foster sound decision-making and cooperation, the Shah controlled
the military directly and made all important decisions himself. Heads of the army, navy, air
force, army aviation, gendarmerie, national police, and intelligence and security
organizations reported directly to the Shah and were not allowed to meet with one another.
Personal loyalty to the monarch was fostered through financial and material considerations,
and promotion was based on loyalty and personal ties rather than competency.
Additionally, various intelligence organizations conducted surveillance of each other and
top officers were encouraged to report on one another. While ensuring against any
possible coup or conspiracy attempt, this system of vertical separation and mistrust made it
impossible for the generals to make decisions on their own or cooperate effectively in either
the operational or political realm. When the Shah departed in January, 1979, the Imperial
Iranian Armed Forces were left headless and without loyalty to the government or the
nation itself. Far from taking over and establishing order by a military coup, as many
Western observers thought probable, the Shah's vaunted military simply dissolved.
2. Post-Revolutionary Armed Forces
The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces were organizationally, psychologically and
physically emasculated by the revolution. As the principal group supporting the monarchy,
the armed forces were viewed with hostility by both the revolutionary leaders and the
population at large. Many junior officers, homqfars (warrant officer technicians) and the
rank-and-file went over to the revolutionary forces. Some senior officers collaborated with
the opposition as they saw their political fortunes change, and many more fled the country
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or were arrested. A large number of personnel simply left the service and went home. In
1979 the army alone experienced a 60 % desertion rate. Finally, the armed forces lost a
great deal of their most experienced leadership to a series of systematic purges carried out
by the revolutionary regime. These were calculated to eliminate any pro-Shah elements
which might prove dangerous to the new government and to establish the clergy's political
control of the military. ' Some sources estimate that nearly all of the Shah's 500 general
officers were eliminated in one way or another, and that approximately 45% of the officer
corps and 68% of field grade officers were purged from the regular military. °
In addition to loss of skilled leadership and personnel, the military also suffered
from the loss of foreign - mainly American - advisors and weapon system support, the
destruction of its logistic and supply system, and the takeover of much equipment by armed
rebel factions. Either by design or circumstance the Iranian military was left in almost
complete disarray, and could play no effective role in the political life or defense of the
nation.
The revolutionary government was not entirely hostile to the armed forces,
however. Though the leftist Mojahedin and Fedayeen guerilla movements called for the
total dissolution of the military and the formation of a "people's army" - in which they
would play a major role - the revolutionary clerics distrusted the leftists and realized that
the army's existence was necessary to guard the nation. Statements by Khomeini and other
leading religious figures attempted to end the popular hostility to the military, while the
purges sought to guarantee clerical rule. In spite of this, little was actually done to revive
the military from the post-revolutionary turmoil, the regular forces being largely neglected
until the Iraqi invasion.
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The many factors stemming from the revolution had a disastrous effect on the
regular armed forces' leadership, technical skills, personnel, logistics and administration,
effects which were keenly felt when Iraq invaded in 1980. This event more than any other
forced the regime to rebuild and restructure the Iranian Armed Forces, and this is the
organization which exists today.
3. The Military Under The Islamic Republic
a. Organization
Under Article 110 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic the supreme
religious leader, or Faqih, is also the supreme commander of the Iranian armed forces.
As such he is vested with sweeping powers to appoint and dismiss top civilian and military
officials and to declare war. Much of this power can be delegated to the President, who
may delegate further as necessary. When the Iraqi invasion came these executive powers
alone were quickly found insufficient to direct the war effort, and under this pressure the
Supreme Defense Council was formed on October 12, 1980. Membership of the SDC
includes the President, Minister of Defense, Chief of the Joint Staff, IRGC Commander,
and two advisors appointed by the Faqih. It may also include several others such as the
Interior Minister, IRGC Minister, IRGC Deputy Commander, and individual service
chiefs. ™ Although membership and responsibility shifts somewhat due to factional
politics and the situation at hand, this system functioned well during the war.
Below the SDC the Iranian military is controlled via both operational and
adrninistrative chains of command, much like the forces of the United States, and is
divided into three major groups: the regular military, the Pasdaran-e Enqelab or Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Sepah-e Basij, or Mobilization Army.
Operational control is exercised by the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, which includes the
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heads of the three regular services (ground forces, air force and navy), the Pasdaran, the
National Police and the Gendarmerie (the Basij is subordinate to the Pasdaran).
Adrninistrative control is performed by the Ministries of Defense and the Ministry of the
Pasdaran, respectively.
b. Regular Armed Forces
Though retaining the traditional ground, air and naval services, the regular
Iranian forces have under gone a major transformation since 1979. Under the Shah the
military was organized along American lines, with large, self-supporting maneuver units
which had their own logistic and maintenance elements. The revolution and war forced a
major rebuilding and restructuring, and the resulting force was redesigned more in the
Soviet style, with smaller combat units and separate supporting elements. This was due
primarily to the lack of logistical capability and infrastructure resulting from the revolution,
and the administrative and manpower burdens required to support the combat
elements. 101 Also, the loss of a single major foreign weapon supplier and the inability to
keep its stock of U.S.-made weapon systems operational due to lack of parts and technical
assistance drastically affected Iran's capabilities. It is estimated that Iran could only keep
half of its major weapon systems operational during the war with Iraq. ^^ Both during
and after the war Iran has relied on a wide array of weapon suppliers, including China,
North Korea, Libya, Syria, Israel, Britain, Taiwan, Pakistan, Argentina, South Africa,
Switzerland, the Warsaw Pact nations, and even the United States. Absorbing and
integrating such a confusing mix of equipment posed a serious challenge. Therefore, while
the number of operational divisions has actually increased, these are smaller units with less
heavy equipment and indigenous support. LyjJ
Along with this change in "tooth to tail" ratio, numbers of personnel in the
regular forces have actually decreased, down to 300,000 from a peak of nearly 450,000 in
1978. 4 Though the Pasdaran and Basij provide additional manpower, they fulfill other
functions, and it was the regular forces which proved most effective during the war with
Iraq. Due to wartime equipment losses and maintenance problems, Iran's ground forces
are heavy on foot soldiers, with 3 1 infantry divisions and only 8 armored, one mechanized
and one special forces division. Of these 41 divisions, 28 are Pasdaran units, which are
nominally equivalent to a Western brigade in size and are primarily lightly armed troops.
There are also 5 independent paratroop/special forces/airborne brigades, again light troops.
Tanks number approximately 700, many of them older Soviet designs. Compare this to a
U.S armored division, which has 348 main battle tanks and 17,000 personnel. Although
impressive in numbers and attempting to modernize, the organization, equipment and
training of these personnel is more significant than numbers alone. The current force
structure of the Iranian ground forces does not constitute a major threat at present. (See
Appendix A for details on current Iranian order of battle.)
While effected less by purges and desertion than the ground forces, the air
force and navy were hurt more by loss of skilled personnel and lack of adequate training
and outside support. The air force performed well in the opening stages of the war in
1980, but was limited for much of the conflict due to maintenance problems. 5 Though
gaining in sophistication since the war, much of their equipment still consists of American
designs for which support is lacking, while the newer items are primarily of Russian and
Chinese origin. Though these systems are currently cheap and plentiful, long-term after-
market support must be questionable today, while their quality is not up to Western
standards. Tehran also has trouble absorbing the newer designs. This weakness is
demonstrated by the fact that upon acquiring over 100 escaping combat aircraft from Iraq
during the Gulf War, Tehran was unable to absorb them and had to turn to outside sources
for technical support. 6 Furthermore, only two squadrons of MIG-29s and one of SU-
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24s have been delivered from Russia, while reported transfer of long-range Backfire
bombers has yet to be confirmed. Again, the effective near-term absorption and
integration of such systems is doubtful, while long-term operational capability without
significant external support is questionable. Finally, the Iranian air defense and control
system is extremely deficient. .Almost non-existent during the Iran-Iraq War, it has
improved little since the cease fire. Again, the example of the escaping Iraqi pilots is
useful, as Iran reportedly had no warning of any airspace violation until their arrival.
The navy was less effected by the revolution and more isolated from the
population than the other services, and its operational forces were relatively intact in
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September, 1980. ° Consequently, it performed well in the opening stages of the war,
but then retired to coastal patrol and shipping interdiction. This was due to lack of an Iraqi
naval threat and to maintenance and logistical shortcomings. This is apparent from the fact
that much of the tanker war was conducted by the IRGC using infantry weapons. The
regular navy was later badly hurt by skirmishes with U.S. forces in 1987-88, and so faced a
major postwar rebuilding program. Currently, Iranian naval vessels and weapon
systems are primarily light coastal units from Western Europe which, while qualitatively
superior, are technically sophisticated and maintenance intensive. The acquisition of Kilo-
class diesel-electric powered attack submarines from Russia are justifiable concerns given
the importance of the Straits of Hormuz, but one must question the level of training and
maintenance required to make these platforms a credible threat. If the unenviable record of
most Third World submarine forces is any indication, it will be inordinately high and
therefore such systems may not be as effective as they appear on paper.
Leadership of the regular military has also undergone a major change since the
revolution. As noted, most of the senior and mid-grade officers were eliminated from the
armed forces in one way or another within the first one to two years after the Shah's
ouster. The ill effects of this loss of experienced leaders was keenly felt during the initial
phases of the war with Iraq. The gap was filled with some senior officers who joined the
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revolution and, primarily, by promoting junior officers to positions of greater responsibility.
Later, those who had proven themselves in combat were given battlefield promotions.
Though still suffering from lack of senior and middle rank professionals, this process
eliminated class distinction and served to increase unit cohesion.
Finally, the regular military's role, character and the way it is viewed by society
have been altered dramatically by war and revolution. The Imperial forces were widely,
and correctly, viewed as the Shah's oppressive tool. With the changes wrought by the
revolution and eight years of war turned the military into the heroic and legitimate
defenders of the nation. Additionally, the transformation of the officer corps, relative lack
of corruption and privilege, visible political control, and the fact that the military is no
longer charged with internal security and regime support serve to heighten its domestic
prestige and make it a bastion of Iranian nationalism, as opposed to Islamic ideology and
political activism. Finally, the regular military continues to be the best organized, most
well-educated, most disciplined, and least religious group in Iranian society.
As important as the Iranian military's capabilities is the degree of political
control exercised over it. ° Although the purges established the revolutionary
government's control of the armed forces, it is maintained through an elaborate system of
political oversight. The methods and organizations involved in this control are numerous
and varied, and are both formal and informal. The latter include such practices as
appointing "Imam's Representatives" (under Khomeini) to military units. Some of the
former are discussed briefly.
The Political Ideological Directorate (PID), while officially a part of the
Ministry of Defense, was actually established under the Central Committee of the IRP. Its
functions include political and ideological indoctrination, propaganda, and internal security.
It also conducts welfare and recreational activities and, importantly, screens personnel for
career advancement. The SDC Secretariat maintains staff assigned to units down to
division level and is primarily responsible for monitoring senior field commanders. The
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Joint Staff maintains a Security and Intelligence Department which gathers information on
commissioned and non-commissioned officers. There is also the Guidance Organization,
which handles identification of political dissidents.
This is by no means an all-inclusive list, and informal means are also
widespread, including the involvement of local Islamic associations. Additionally, the
officer corps has a high degree of control, including promotion oversight and restrictions
on horizontal communication and freedom of movement.
What is important here is the overlapping and confusing nature of political
control mechanisms in the Iranian military. Though extensive and well-institutionalized,
their effectiveness is limited by the confused lines of authority and command, duplication
of effort, informal and personal ties and activities, and political rivalries among the control
organizations. It is also significant that while some of these organizations are also active in
the Pasdaran, political control of that arm is by no means as comprehensive as is that of the
regular military.
While ineffective and inefficient in many respects, the various organizations and
methods used by the clerics in controlling the regular forces do serve to restrict the flow of
information, freedom of action, personal following and esprit de corps of the regular armed
forces. Though not as centrally controlled, these mechanisms are not unlike those
employed by the Shah. In light of the deleterious effects of such control on the Imperial
Iranian Armed Forces, observers must question the effectiveness of the forces of the
Islamic Republic.
c Pasdaran^*
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, or Pasdaran, was established by a
decree of Ayatollah Khomeini on May 5, 1979. * * ~ This decree did not mark the
beginning of the Guards existence, but instead was an attempt to establish government
control over a large number of armed militia bands that had appeared around the fall of the
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monarchy. Many of these previously existed as members of extremist Islamic groups, or as
hired guards (pasdars) of influential religious and political leaders. As such they had no
central control or national identity, but exhibited loyalty to localized figures based on
personal or kinship ties. In the revolutionary turmoil of February, 1979 these groups
became the de facto enforcers of the Islamic regime. Suspicious of both the regular
military and the leftist guerilla bands, Khomeini and his ruling circle saw a need to establish
their own loyal security organization as well as central control and public order. The
pasdars were a ready solution to this problem.
Since that time the Pasdaran has become institutionalized as one of "the most
powerful political and military organization(s) in Iran." ^ It is charged by Article 150 of
the 1979 constitution with "defending the revolution and safeguarding its
achievements." 1 i4 This vague definition has left a great deal of room for interpretation on
just what this mission entails, and so Pasdaran functions have expanded over the years.
Duties include guarding important government buildings and officials, putting down
internal disturbances and fighting alongside the regular military in defense of the country.
It has also become a road to advancement for many current leaders of the regime and is
often a goal and a means of factional power struggles within the government. Thus, its
"evolution is not unlike the Waffen SS in Nazi Germany, starting out as a largely political
organization with primarily internal and security functions, then developing rapidly into a
regular military force with heavy weapons and with a hierarchical command structure." 113
The Pasdaran has, in effect, replaced the Shah's military as the major pillar of the regime
and coercive force within society.
The Pasdaran currently comprises a force of 170,000 members, approximately
half of the regular armed forces. In spite of this, most of the divisions currently organized
are Pasdaran divisions, which are likely smaller than either Western-style divisions or those
of the regular ground forces. These numbers and organization are somewhat deceptive,
however. In reality, the Pasdaran are organized into largely autonomous battalion-sized
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units which may operate independently or in cooperation with the regulars. While they do
possess heavy weapons such as tanks and artillery, these are not present in large
formations. Most Pasdaran troops remain lightly armed, irregular infantry forces. Though
air and naval units of the Pasdaran have been established, these are also light units such as
coastal speedboats equipped with machine guns and rockets. Additionally, a major part of
the IRGC is not deployed to defend the country, but is employed in internal security
functions in major urban centers. In spite of its evolution into a military force and its
highly-publicized combat role in the war with Iraq, the Pasdaran remains largely a political
enforcement arm of the clerical regime.
<L Basij
Like the Pasdaran, the Sepah-e Basij, or Mobilization Army (formerly the
Basij-e Mostazafin, or Mobilization of the Oppressed) was established by Khomeini's
declaration when, on November 26, 1979, he called for a people's army of 20 million. 1 *"
This was primarily due to the continuing internal dissent facing the clerical regime and fears
of U.S. intervention following the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran. Unlike the
IRGC, however, the Basij did not previously exist and had to be formed out of whole
cloth. Given the divided political situation in Iran at the time, its definition and formation
were quite slow. It originally consisted of volunteers who received rudimentary ideological
and military training and served in civil defense, disaster relief and internal security roles,
including the fight against the Kurdish resistance. As with other lasting military reforms,
the first meaningful development of the Basij had to await the onset of hostilities with Iraq.
In late 1980 the Basij was made subordinate to the Pasdaran, serious attention
was given to its organization and expansion, and it became a sort of "active reserve"
paramilitary organization. It is administratively controlled by the Ministry of the Pasdaran,
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and operationally controlled by the Central Basij Committee via the Pasdaran Central Staff.
Important functions include internal security and intelligence, education, workers'
mobilization and tribal mobilization.
With renewed emphasis given by the war the Basij expanded rapidly. Though
it never became the army of 20 million envisioned by Khomeini, numbers during the war
were substantial, with claims to having trained 3 million volunteers, 600,000 of which had
seen combat 1 17 With wartime mobilization of the nation, the character of the
organization also changed. Though still recruited from the urban and rural poor, the age
range shifted from men and women between 20 and 30 to those under 20 and over 35-
40. ° The primary role changed to that of augmenting regular combat forces, and greater
emphasis was placed on military training and discipline. During the war many thousands
of Basij members were dispatched to the front, where they played significant roles in the
1982 and 1984 offensives, and many died in "human wave" attacks. In spite of an
increased "combat" orientation, their training was still substandard and casualty rate
excessively high. Though their presence was useful for sheer weight of numbers and
probably morale, their operational importance was normally less than supposed. This can
be gauged by the fact that its membership has been drastically reduced since the war.
This is not to say that the Basij is not important, but that its significance is more
political and social than military. It covers most Iranian towns and villages, where it plays
an influential role in political-ideological education, propaganda, security, and training,
especially in the provinces. Much Kke the Pasdaran, it has become the preferred vehicle
for upward mobility for many low-income youths. Women also have a visible part in the
Basij, where their duties range from security guards and local intelligence to political
education of children. Finally, the organization is often mobilized for political
demonstrations in support of the government "By engaging in activities of this nature, the
Basij has evolved into a powerful religious and political propaganda organization...." 1 iy
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e. Logistics and Defense Production * ^"
Like all other aspects of Iran's national security apparatus, the logistics and
defense production systems were seriously disrupted by the revolution, reorganized and
expanded, though not necessarily improved, during the war, and are currently in a post-war
rebuilding phase.
The logistical system before the revolution, while not superb, was reasonably
adequate by Middle Eastern standards. With the revolution, however, supply,
transportation and communication underwent an almost total breakdown. For example, the
computerized supply system purchased by the Shah was sabotaged, either by departing
American advisors, revolutionaries or both, thereby destroying virtually all records of
available spare parts. Transportation, especially the railways, was damaged nearly as badly,
making troop movement, supply and reinforcement extremely difficult. In the fall of 1980,
for example, it took one division over six weeks to move from Mashad to Khuzestan. Also
serious were the international embargo and loss of external technical support. More
significant than these factors was the political in-fighting and rivalry of the Pasdaran with
the regular forces. This resulted in almost total neglect of the already crippled logistic
system prior to the Iraqi invasion and made reconstruction of it extremely difficult for some
time afterwards.
With the stimulus of war came new efforts to rectify the situation, but the new
system did not develop clearly or efficiently. The regular military and Pasdaran
increasingly had to compete with each other as the latter gained its own indigenous supply
system. Additionally, the remodeled Provision Organization and the newly created
Reconstruction Crusade further confused the situation. Civilian organizations semi-
responsible to the Ministry of Defense, they eventually came to deal in civilian economic
development, agriculture and industry, while supporting the armed forces with logistics
manpower, supplies and transportation. This competing and politicized structure proved
difficult to coordinate. In many instances during the war front line units received different
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provisions than those stationed next to them, thus directly effecting operational and tactical
employment.
Suffice it to say that, like many other issues in Iran, that of military logistics
suffers from too many overlapping and poorly coordinated organizations which are
inefficient, distribute supplies unevenly and are handicapped by over-reliance on traditional
familial ties and practices. Although overcoming these problems in wartime with a great
deal of improvisation and intensive manpower, continued factionalism on all levels can be
expected to hamper Iranian logistics for some time to come.
Iran's indigenous defense industries underwent a similar experience.
Consolidated under the Shah's Military Industries Organization in 1963, the defense
industry was growing in scope and sophistication by the late 1970s. Badly damaged by the
departure of foreign technicians and imposition of the international embargo, it was given
new emphasis by the war.
Re-organized under the central auspices of the Defense Industries Organization,
which is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, it was also divided in several ways. Not
only did the regular military operate and maintain production facilities, so did the IRGC
and the Reconstruction Crusade. Thus, the defense industries were subject to the ills of a
centralized economy as well as inefficient planning and coordination - in short the worst of
both worlds. Although able to repair and make parts for many weapons, they are unable to
properly maintain the more sophisticated systems, and are forced to produce large
quantities of simple, low-quality items rather than specialize in a few high technology
products. They continue to be hampered by lack of adequately skilled technicians and
managers, and rely on training less well-educated personnel just to reach the numbers
necessary for maintenance purposes. Perhaps the best characterization of the state of the
Iranian defense industry is Tehran's own boast of having some 240 state-owned and
12,000 privately owned military production facilities with over 45,000 personnel. V£- v Yet
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this is less than four people per facility, which makes it difficult to see how the DIO can be
productive enough in any area to support the large numbers of personnel in the armed
forces. However, some steps have been taken to improve this situation, including the 1989
merger of regular forces and IRGC production plants. ^
f. Wartime Performance
This is not an attempt to analyze military operations during the Iran-Iraq War,
but rather to draw general lessons about the performance of the Iranian forces in their
major combat test. While this may not be a reliable indicator of future results, it is the best
gauge currently available.
The major lesson which can be drawn from the war is the regular military's
superiority over "revolutionary" paramilitary forces and its continuing identification with
Iran's fundamental national interests. In spite of their highly visible, and highly publicized,
role in combat the Pasdaran can in actuality take credit for few successes. The "human
wave" assaults of the 1981-1982 offensives, during which Iraqi forces were driven from
Khuzestan, did not succeed on their own. Instead, their successes "resulted from their
incorporation into comprehensive combined-arms operations, carried out under
professional military direction. ^ During the later counter-invasion of Iraq, when the
Pasdaran had assumed primacy, its massed frontal tactics failed at high human cost. Later
victories, notably the capture of Faw, were a result of planning and coordination between
the IRGC and the regular forces. It is apparent that revolutionary zeal, religious
martyrdom and superior numbers are not a substitute for professional training and
organization, nor can they overcome a well-prepared defense possessing superior
technology and firepower. Only under the direction of the professional forces did Iran
achieve any measure of success on the battlefield.
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The regular forces political role regarding Iran's interests in the course of the
war are also instructive. After the Iraqis were driven out of Khuzestan, moderate political
factions and the regular military argued against continuing the war into Iraq, for both
political and military reasons.^^ When their opinion was overruled, they took little part in
the subsequent offensives, which, as noted, failed miserably. It is unclear whether the
regulars have the political weight or credibility to successfully oppose ill-advised ventures in
the future. However, they have a proven combat record and precedent for such
opposition, and their continued focus as the bastion of Iranian nationalism and popular
prestige may make their opinion hard to ignore.
Air and naval operations also offer some significant lessons. Due to Iran's
strategic depth and geography these warfare areas grant Iran certain advantages. Most of
its major population centers are deep in the interior of the country, making air and missile
attacks more difficult, while its coastline controls both the head of the Gulf and the Straits
of Hormuz. Indeed, Iran used these advantages at the outset of the war by carrying out
successful air and naval strikes to destroy Iraq's oil export facilities and naval installations,
and drive back much of its front line air defense systems. Soon, however, both its air and
naval forces were severely hampered by personnel and material shortages, and played little
part in the rest of the conflict. In fact, fixed-wing aircraft were in such short supply that
the ground forces relied primarily on helicopters for close air support. ° Similarly, the
"tanker war" was carried out by lightly armed Pasdaran units due to lack of larger combat
vessels. It is therefore difficult to predict if these forces would perform better if properly
supported and equipped. However, air and naval operations also revealed certain Iranian
weaknesses.
Air strikes were not carried out in a well-planned and coordinated manner, and
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the air defense system was neither integrated nor operational for much of the conflict. Z>
It is by no means certain that this problem has been solved even yet. Furthermore, Iranian
geography can also be a vulnerability. Iran's oil production and export facilities are all
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extremely vulnerable, as Iraq demonstrated by its own air strikes time and again. In fact,
this geographical and economic vulnerability was the principle reason for the escalation of
the tanker war which eventually drew in U.S. forces. Despite valid non-belligerent fears of
Iranian escalation, Iraq conducted the vast majority of strikes against Iranian shipping and
facilities, and was largely successful in its strategic aims. Iran's inability to protect its
economic lifeline, even with naval superiority and at least local parity in the air, indicates a
fundamental lack of a key military capability. Again, emphasis on coastal patrol craft and
submarines cannot reverse this situation. As with the air defense arena, the vulnerability
remains.
It is difficult to tell if the post-war Iranian military is substantially improved over
the wartime forces. Significantly, planners must look at logistics, supply, production, air
defense and naval capabilities in order to gauge the current forces. Numbers are of little
significance without both appropriate equipment and support on the one hand, and
professional training and ability on the other.
Despite their numerous shortcomings, the war proved a means of resurgence to
the professional Iranian military and its record during the conflict offers a lesson in its
current warfighting abilities. Virtually destroyed through purge, neglect and desertion, the
Iranian armed forces were totally unprepared for war with Iraq. Yet the war gave the
government a vested interest in reviving the professional forces, and they gave a reasonable
account of themselves on the battlefield. In fact, the performance of the regular elements
in major offensives provided the difference needed to achieve key victories. The war also




Much has been made of Iran's military buildup since the defeat of Iraq in the
Second Gulf War. While Tehran is undertaking weapons acquisition and modernization
programs, and undoubtedly intends to pursue its own regional aims and establish a form of
military self-sufficiency, the buildup needs to be put into perspective. While certainly
cause for concern, Iranian forces may not be as strong, capable or threatening as it may
appear from press reports.
a. Defense Budgets
Estimates of Iran's defense spending vary widely and are extremely hard to
substantiate. Most sources agree that figures cited for defense spending do not include
money for procurement. This is complicated by the fact that much former Soviet
equipment is likely selling at bargain prices, while some may be bartered from the cash-
strapped republics for oil and natural gas. Iranian opposition sources place procurement
spending for 1991 at $19 billion dollars. 28 This seems inordinately high given Iranian
economic troubles and continuing low oil prices. Less biased authorities place military
expenditures for 1991 at just over six billion dollars, down from a post-1979 peak of
$10.23 billion in 1982. 129 The CIA estimates allocations for 1992/93 hardware purchases
at two billion dollars, 130 and puts the 1990-94 total at $10 billion. 131 Others make a
reasonable estimate of five to six billion dollars per year. ^
Similarly, estimates of defense outlays as a percentage of GDP and in relation
to social services also vary. Appendix B, Tables 1-3 illustrate different figures for the
defense spending of major Middle East nations at constant prices and as a percentage of
GDP. According to SIPRL Iran's defense expenditures as a percentage ofGDP averaged
between two and one-half and four and one-half percent between 1982 and 1987. Other
sources place the current percentage at nine percent. This may reflect an increase for post-
war re-building, or it may be due to the inclusion of procurement estimates. By any
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measure, however, these figures are not excessive compared to those of Iraq, Saudi Arabia
or Israel. Iran also compares favorably regarding social versus military spending. Tehran's
current total public investment is at 7 percent, whereas that of the Arab Gulf states tends to
be much higher. There defense spending is a much greater percentage of GDP and often
exceeds that for social services (see Appendix B, Table 4). Iran may also still be in a
rebuilding stage, having suffered considerable damage from the war with Iraq, including
300,000 casualties and loss of up to 60 percent of its major military equipment. 133
Additionally, the 1 993/94 defense budget may be facing serious cuts due to the devaluation
of the rial and other economic reforms. 134 These facts do not necessarily portray Iran as
the all-pervasive threat it is often made out to be.
b. Manpower
Iran's large and rapidly growing population is often cited as a reason for the
GCC states to fear Tehran. While this is a valid claim, and conversely the Arab
monarchies' lack of personnel is a serious weakness, the reverse is also true. Though it is
obviously easier for Tehran to field a half-million man military than, say, Oman, such a
large and diverse population also presents problems. Iranian GDP per capita and living
standards are much lower, thus placing a higher priority on social programs and stable,
diversified economic development. Iran also exercises the form, if not the substance, of
democracy and is traditionally a more pluralistic and politically active society than are those
of its Arab neighbors. A sizable population in a large and still developing country also
presents substantial problems in state control of the populace for military mobilization,
education and extraction of revenue. In fact, lack of recruits caused Tehran considerable
domestic political trouble during the war. 5 Mobilization and state control is much more
difficult and less pervasive in Iran than it is in Iraq or Syria, with their smaller population
and area and highly institutionalized political systems. It can be seen from Appendix C that
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while Iranian numbers are greater, its mobilization ratios are much lower than most other
nations of the region. Just as Iran's geography makes the nation both dominant and
vulnerable, so its personnel resources are both an asset and a liability.
c. Intentions and Capabilities
Force structure and organization were discussed above, and are summarized in
Appendix A. The capabilities granted by this force structure and the intentions for this
capability warrant a brief review.
The army is structured more for the kind of trench and urban warfare seen
during the Iran-Iraq war and for limited and irregular operations than for offensive,
maneuver warfare of the type practiced by the United States. Though effective in
suppressing insurgencies and carrying out cross-border raids, such forces would be useful
for only limited offensives in a major conflict. Operations near the Iran-Iraq border in
particular are hampered by mountainous terrain, water obstacles and seasonal flooding,
making mobility, prolonged offensives and logistic support difficult
These factors and Iran's strategic depth make high technology air and missile
warfare more attractive. Indeed, Tehran seems to be concentrating much of its re-arming
program on offensive air warfare and ballistic missile systems. Air and missile forces could
certainly carry out strikes against targets in the region, but objectives would necessarily be
limited unless in concert with general land offensives or clearly defined political objectives.
While certainly possible in some scenarios, such predictions ignore the major hurdles Iran
has yet to overcome in air warfare planning and command and control, as well as in air
defense and maintenance of sophisticated systems.
There is also the question of the vulnerable Straits, through which so much of
the world's oil supply travels. Naval, air and missile assets could conceivably attempt to
control the Gulf and close the Straits of Hormuz, but this is more complicated than it
appears. The surest method of closure would be through mine warfare, but currents in the
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straits make minelayina difficult and such a minefield would present a hazard to Iranian
shipping as well. Selective air and naval control would be a preferable strategy, and recent
and planned acquisitions of submarines, missile patrol craft and anti-shipping missiles point
to this option. Indeed, well-publicized naval maneuvers, such as "Victory 3" in May, 1992
are designed to demonstrate Iran's sea-denial capability. Again, however, Tehran suffers
from the same shortcomings of training, maintenance and logistics. For example, some
Western naval authorities state that Iran's Kilo submarines will not be mission capable for
three years, and cannot be fully operational for at least 8-10 years. ***
Finally, the question of strategy arises. To what end would Iran wish to close
the straits? As demonstrated in the tanker war, Iran is far more dependent on and
vulnerable to loss of free navigation than are other states of the area. Such action would
not only hurt Iran economically as much as any other state, but would invariably invite
military retaliation. It must be remembered that while Iranian forces did a credible job of
fighting Iraq to a stalemate over eight years, the U.S. coalition routed the world's fourth
largest army with six weeks of air strikes and a 100 hour ground offensive. It is doubtful
that Iran desires similar treatment. Therefore, Iran would probably attempt to close the sea
lanes only if its own oil production and exporting facilities were destroyed. Such a strategy
is clearly not in Tehran's best interest.
Much of the Iranian re-armament is likely targeted at countering Iraq, still a
major regional power despite its recent defeat.
The Iranians have reason to fear the resurgent power of Iraq...much of (the current
arms buildup) may be justified as a prudent measure against a reoccurrence of the
beating the country took at the hands of Saddam Hussein m the 1980s. LJ
Renewed conflict between Iran and Iraq is one of the most likely scenarios for violence in
the region.^ While undesirable, such a conflict would not pose a direct threat to
Western interests unless it escalated uncontrollably.
Iran's next most likely targets are Saudi Arabia and the GCC states. Though
these nations arc less able to defend themselves than Iraq, geography presents a major
obstacle. Here Tehran can only threaten or attack by air or sea. While a credible threat,
such attacks can be effectively countered by current GCC forces. Iran currently lacks the
ability, training and force structure to carry out a major amphibious operation. As with
other scenarios, objectives would have to be extremely limited and politically well-defined.
The lack of sufficient amphibious lift capability limits any operation in the central and
southern Gulf to minor attacks on or seizure of islands or oil platforms. "In sum, a major
attack by Iran on its .Arab neighbors does not seem to be a particularly easy matter, nor
does it appear to offer an opportunity for quick seizure of a digestible objective." 1 "*"
Iran's final and least likely target is Israel. Recent acquisitions of long range
strike aircraft and ballistic missiles, and the possibility of nuclear weapons development,
give substance to Tehran's inflammatory rhetoric. Such a scenario does not appear
realistic, however. While the Iranian threat may be useful politically to both Tehran and
Tel Aviv, Israel's military superiority and the demonstrated will to use it, plus a nuclear
arsenal of its own, provide more than enough deterrence to any Iranian plans. Even some
Israelis have "argued that Iran may have higher priority strategic interests which would take
precedence over its quarrel with Israel...." 1™
We must conclude that while Tehran's military build up appears threatening,
their forces are still recovering from losses during the war with Iraq; newer, sophisticated
systems are extremely maintenance intensive and require a great deal of training and
support; and the forces are not structured for a major land or amphibious offensive,
especially against the U.S. -allied GCC states.
d Summary
The Iranian armed forces have undergone a major transformation since 1979.
Though touted as the policeman of the Gulf and generally recognized as one of the
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strongest militaries in the Middle East, the structure and organization imposed by the Shah
actually made it a hollow force, one which collapsed under the strain of the revolution.
Under the impetus provided by eight years of war, the professional military has
since revived. Proven superior to the paramilitary revolutionary forces in combat, the
regular forces have changed from the coercive arm of the regime to the legitimate
defenders of the nation. Though not completely egalitarian, the vast social differences and
financial privileges that characterized the imperial forces have been removed, as has
widespread corruption. The regular military is more professional, cohesive, nationalistic
and more closely identified with the Iranian people than it ever was under the monarchy. It
is also under fairly tight political control, and hampered by an inefficient logistical system
and lack of supply and maintenance support and qualified personnel. However, it is likely
more effective due to wartime experience, morale and leadership. Though having little
political power, it continues to be a strong core of moderation, nationalism and rationality
in Iranian society.
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Conversely, the Pasdaran and its sister organization, the Basij, act as the
supporting pillars of the clerical regime and the oppressors of the population. They are
highly politicized, enjoy a privileged place in society, and their leaders have a strong
political voice. They are also fraught by internal divisions and operate on personal loyalty,
and as such are often pawns in political power struggles. Although under less direct
centralized control than the Shah exercised, the Pasdaran plays a similar role and has
similar weaknesses as did the imperial forces. Significantly, it is also under less stringent
control than the regular military and has the potential to play a larger political role. If ever
put to that test, however, the Guard Corps my prove to be as hollow under pressure as did
the Shah's generals.
In all likelihood the Iranian military is not the threat it is often depicted.
Though expanding, it still lacks advanced combat capability, supporting infrastructure, and
technically qualified personnel. Planned weapon system acquisitions (see Appendix D) are
impressive, but effective absorption and support of high technology equipment are
probably beyond current capability. While Iranian forces and manpower resources are
larger than those of its neighbors, this numerical superiority is offset by sophisticated
weapons, training, geography and cooperation of the U.S. with its allies, especially in the
air and naval arenas. "As long as the United States and its major allies are not otherwise
engaged in conflict elsewhere in the world, and as long as access to oil is deemed critical to
Western security, the likelihood of overt Iranian aggression remains low." Therefore,
assuming rationality of Iranian political and military leaders, it is likely that the conventional
build-up is largely for defensive purposes and, more significantly, to gain political
ascendancy. Even if Iranian leaders manage to achieve their most ambitious military goals,
U.S. protection of the Gulf oil fields and navigability unquestionably outweighs any
potential military threat from Iran.
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D. IRAN'S ECONOMY TODAY
This is not an in-depth study of the state of the Iranian economy since 1979. That is
well outside the scope of this paper. However, it does offer a brief analysis of the state of
the economy in the belief that the economic condition of a nation has a profound effect on
the policies its government pursues both domestically and internationally. It is also an
attempt to compare the economic conditions in Iran during the late 1970s with those of
today in order to put the current conditions into perspective vis a vis those which prevailed
just prior to the revolution.
1. Pre-Revolutionary Conditions
The economic conditions under the Shah, especially in the mid to late 1970s, have
often been cited as a major cause of dissent which contributed to the revolution. However,
many results of the White Revolution reforms and the drive to industrialization were quite
positive. From 1960-1977 Iran registered an average annual real growth rate of 9.6
percent, nearly double that of other countries in the same category. Extensive welfare
programs also made significant reductions in infant mortality, disease, and illiteracy rates,
while caloric intake, life expectancy and school enrollment were all increased. *l
Unfortunately, the Shah's drive to use Iran's extensive oil reserves to create an
industrialized nation, make socioeconomic reforms and become a major military power all
at once and in short order proved to be too ambitious a goal. The rapid modernization and
urbanization created alienating social dislocation, fed corruption and increased the rural-
urban and intra-sector income gaps. In 1973-74 the top 20% of the population accounted
for 55.5 percent of household expenditures, while the bottom 20 percent made up only 3.7
percent, then one of the largest disparities in the world. 3 The nation also gained little
from its extensive higher education programs. From 1950-1968, 325,731 students were
sent abroad for higher education, but only 22,681 returned. 4
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While economic accomplishments under the Pahlavi reign were impressive, the
growth was actually too rapid and unbalanced for the strength of the existing social and
political structures. Additionally, a decrease in oil prices hurt the economy in 1977-78,
creating a classic "J-curve" condition, where a failure of rising expectations adversely
impacted both the elites and masses of such a rentier state, thus contributing to dissent even
among the upper and middle classes.
2. Problems ofWar and Revolution
The economy of the Islamic Republic was necessarily based on Islamic terms in
order to correct the wrongs of the decadent, Westernized Imperial regime. The trouble has
been that of identifying exactly what those terms are. An idealistic vision of social justice
and benevolent centralized control, wholesale nationalization of industries, the confusing
status of private property, and land reform that has remained in limbo for years have
hampered any realistic management of a potentially rich nation with a rapidly growing
population. A number of other factors have hindered the Republic's economic growth,
including exodus of trained personnel and capital, a high birth rate, fluctuating oil prices,
Western sanctions, international isolation, the war with Iraq and an influx of 3-4 million
refugees from Iraq and Afghanistan. *6 Additionally, the decision to export the Islamic
revolution further strained the country's economic and political resources and increased
isolation. Although somewhat mitigated by an extensive infrastructure, large industrial
capacity and currency reserves inherited from the Shah's regime, these factors have taken
their toll.
Between 1978 and 1991, real GDP declined at an annual average rate of 1.5
percent, so that total 1989 GDP equaled that in 1973, just prior to the oil boom. During
approximately the same period, per capita consumption fell from 153,00 rials to 125,000
rials, while the economy shifted from a liberal consumer orientation to one of central
control and wartime austerity. Public investment dropped from 1 8 percent to 7 percent of
GDP. Unemployment was officially at 14 percent, but was actually estimated to be up to
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twice as high. One-third of total employment was in the public sector and agricultural
employment had decreased by 10 percent. In spite of government emphasis on agriculture,
which raised that sector's share ofGDP input from 12.4 percent in 1977 to 18 percent in
1 989, the nation still imported 1 7 percent of its foodstuffs. It also appears that the mass
poor have benefitted little from the change in government. In 1972, approximately 44
percent of the population were officially below the poverty line. Indications, while not
official, are that absolute poverty increased by 43 percent from 1979-85, and by 1988
some 65-75 percent of the population lived in poverty. '
Oil is obviously the major factor of the Iranian economy, and as such it deserves
special mention. The oil and gas industries, being primarily located in Khuzestan province,
were especially hard hit during the war with Iraq. Total infrastructure damage from the
war was estimated by a UN team to be on the order of $97 billion, while Tehran puts it at
$1 trillion. 8 While this was not just the oil sector, it obviously comprised a major
portion of this total. It was also hurt by poor maintenance and management, loss of
technical expertise, and lack of capital investment
Iran's oil production hit a low of 1.46 million barrels per day (mbd) in 1980-82, as
compared to 5.6 mbd in 1976. It increased slightly during the rest of the war, ranging
between 2.2-2.9 mbd. Following the cease fire in 1988, production had climbed to 3.2-3.4
mbd. 149 Iran recently accepted an OPEC quota of 3.49 mbd vice the 3.8 mbd they
demanded, *^ and indications are that they have rarely if ever exceeded 4 mbd since the
war's end. 151 As a result, oil industry contribution to GDP declined from 30-40 percent in
the 1970s to only 9-17 percent in the 1980s, while still accounting for over 90 percent of
exports and government revenues.^ Although registering substantial overall growth
since the cease fire, the rebuilding process is slow and costly. For the Iranian year ended in
March, 1993, oil revenues amounted to $14.5 billion, $2 billion less than planned.
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Production for the year averaged just under 2.4 mbd, almost 500,000 barrels per day less
than projected. L JD The continued weak performance of the oil sector and its large portion
of government revenues is probably the clearest indication of the current state of the
Iranian economy.
3. Post-War Reforms
As mentioned above, since the Rafsanjani administration took over in 1989, there
have been several reforms initiated in the nation's economy, including privatization and
courting assistance from the industrialized world, particularly Western Europe and Japan.
Tliree major initiatives are at the heart of the attempted economic recovery. Iran has been
undertaking development and rebuilding programs to expand its oil production capacity.
Tehran's Oil Ministry recently announced plans to reach production of 4.6 mbd in 1994, 5
mbd in 1995 and to exceed 5.5 mbd by the year 2000. However, Western oil experts
doubt that these targets are achievable without substantial involvement of international
firms in secondary recovery programs and on the mainland. West European companies
have been working to expand offshore capacity since 1990, but are restricted from working
on the mainland by political considerations and legal restrictions that prohibit "concessions"
and "production sharing". 4 It is not yet clear if restrictions will be eased enough to allow
the technical assistance and outside investment which the oil industry badly needs in order
to meet Iran's ambitious goals.
The 1989-94 five year plan relied heavily "on foreign sources for investment in
development projects and to pay off debts by drawing on the output of these projects". 155
Seemingly a mix of import substitution and export-led growth, in Iran's unique case of
post-war rebuilding of a fairly extensive existing infrastructure, this policy appears to be
garnering results. "There are indications that the billions of dollars invested in massive
industrial projects over the past five years have started to pay off in terms of lower import
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requirements and extra revenues from non-oil exports." 156 Indeed, Iran was able to cut
imports and achieve a rough trade balance for the past year, but this was of course done
through government intervention and not by market forces or business decisions, and
probably with little regard for the effect on consumers.
Finally, the most recent and drastic step was the devaluation of the rial in March,
1993. This is a desperate move to transform the economy from its centralized control and
move Iran into the global market system. The move was helped by World Bank loans of
over S800 million with another $500 million possible, a potential Japanese loan of $325
million, and the deferment of payments on letters of credit held by Germany and Japan,
Iran's largest trading partners, said to be worth several hundred million dollars. Though
expected to make Iran more attractive to international investors and ease credit rates
abroad, the domestic impacts could be severe. Inflation is expected to rise to 30 percent
from its current 20 percent rate, and unemployment will also increase. If Tehran can
engender confidence and stability to hold off currency speculation and stave off social
unrest in the short term, the long term effects could be positive. Rafsanjani and his
political and economic reformers are counting on the convertible rial to force Iran into




Aside from domestic economic reforms, Iran has recently been very active in the
international marketplace. Reciprocal visits by Iranian and Georgian delegations earlier this
year, including a trip to Tehran by Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze in January,
discussed supplies of Iranian natural gas and aluminum to Georgia, the construction of
connecting pipelines and highways, modernization of Georgian ports and refineries by Iran,
1 CO
and the sale to Iran of Georgian-manufactured Sukhoi SU-25 warplanes. ° A delegation
to Croatia headed by Majlis speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri reached agreement on orders
for several large vessels to be built in Croation shipyards, 5y for Iran to sell oil directly to
Croatia, and for the countries to increase trade to $200 million annually. 160
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Closer to home, Tehran is considering joining Sharjah-based Crescent Petroleum in
a Qatar-Pakistan gas pipeline project, where a line from Iran's southeast fields would join a
trans-Gulf line to Pakistan. An Iran-India gas pipeline is also under study. A
Canadian-European consortium is attempting to begin the conventional, 1,100 MW
Shazand power plant near the industrial city of Arak. °^ National carrier Iran Air is
attempting to purchase 20 Boeing 737-400 passenger aircraft worth up to $20 million. The
deal was canceled by the Bush administration due to an embargo on dual-use equipment,
but the Clinton administration, pledged to help the airline industry, has agreed to review the
situation. 3 Iran is also attempting to forge economic links with the Muslim Central
Asian republics, where Tehran hopes to serve as the bridge between these landlocked
nations and the Gulf. Kazakhstan, in particular, plays an important role in Iran's Silk Route
Project for access to China. While these nations are potential future members of the ECO,
Iran, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan formed a Caspian Sea cooperative
grouping in February, 1992. They already have shipping protocols covering not only
major Caspian Sea ports, but also Bandar Abbas and Bandar Khomeini on the Gulf.
All of these economic initiatives may seem relatively minor and scattered, but they
are important indicators to the direction Iran is taking. With deep economic problems,
mounting domestic dissatisfaction, and a growing population, Tehran doubtless sees a need
to reform and has a window of opportunity brought about by the rapidly changing world
situation. If the government does not take advantage of this soon - by currency reform,
decentralization and improved international business ties - it may not be able to do so at all.
Faced with a stagnant economy and vast social problems, Rafsanjani
has a decade, two at the most, to reconstruct and reform Iran. If he doesn't do it Iran,
despite its enormous civilization, tremendous manpower resources and oil wealth, will




In Iran, as in the United States, domestic policy is foreign policy is domestic policy.
Due to its dual system of government, extreme factionalism and internal dissent, and the
strong ideological nature of the revolution, this situation is exaggerated in Iran. Under the
charismatic leadership of Khomeini, there was never any doubt about where the real power
lay, especially after that power was fully consolidated. After his death in 1989, however,
the multi-layered system of Velayet-e Faqih, President, Cabinet, Council of Guardians, and
Majlis has confused the power structure considerably.
After ten years of revolution, war, privation and violence in the name of Islam, Iran
seemed ready to return to normal and the pragmatic Rafsanjani, long-time speaker of the
Majlis and viewed as an astute politician, was able to consolidate power and embark on
cautious reforms. His hand was apparently strengthened by an overwhelming success for
moderates in the Majlis elections in April, 1992. 5 In mid-1992, however, Rafsanjani
began to face increasing challenges from the radical hard-line clerics, led by the faqih, AH
Khamenei.
Radical Hizbullahi elements must always be given priority over non-Hizbullahis. They
must be present at all levels in the administration and in the armed forces.... since the
main enemy of Islam...is the arrogance of the world with the U.S. at its head.
Thus he told a gathering of clerical leaders on 29 July, 1992. " In August Rafsanjani
offered to resign following accusations of attempting to remove all hard-line clerics from
power and undermining Khamenei's position. The faqih declined the offer, and the
president subsequently pledged "lull and total obedience" to the line of Ayatollah
Khomeini. In September, it was reported that Khamenei and Rafsanjani had experienced a
bitter falling out, after which the latter announced a shift away from his market-oriented
economic policies.^ The following month one of Khamenei's spokesmen, Ayatollah
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Jannati, criticized a policy of repatriating skilled Iranians living abroad to help in rebuilding
the economy, stating that
Iranian Muslim people did not make the revolution for land, bread, water or a better life,
but only for Islam....The government is encouraging the corrupt Westernized Iranians...to
come back and help create a better life for the people. This is surely a crime. "°
The political power struggle was punctuated by violence around the country. Many
cities experienced street demonstrations and riots in May, June, and August, including
severe ones in Meshed, Arak and Shiraz. Fed by poor economic conditions and sparked
by attempts of government forces to move squatters out of their slums, this was some of
most extreme mass violence since the revolution. 9 There were more organized instances
also, with bombs exploding in several cities, including one at the Behesht-e-Zahra cemetery
in Tehran, where Khomeini is buried. 1 ' ° Though unclear whether these were the work of
the Iraqi-supported Mojahedin-e Khalq, it was fairly obvious that they, like the
demonstrations, were aimed at the government. Although the Mojahedin continues its
campaign, the domestic unrest has apparently been effectively contained.
Though this appears to be a victory for the radicals, the signals remain mixed. As
of November, 1992, some 100,000 highly educated technocrats had returned to Iran from
abroad in order to help boost the flagging economy. 71 A bill was implemented allowing
women to receive "wages in cash" from a husband who divorces them. The bill, seen as a
major reform for women, had been stopped the previous year by the conservative Council
of Guardians. In much of the country, there was continued, but slow, easing of restrictions
1 77 1 7^
on such everyday activities as music, dress, and entertainment. l/-> llD The numerous
economic changes sited above, especially closer industrial dealings with the West and
currency reforms, are further signs of a rational relaxation of domestic policy.
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It appears on the surface that Khamenei is firmly in control, but this cannot be said
with certainty. It is likely that he rallied hard-line support in order to preserve his own
power in the face of Rafsanjani's success at home and abroad. However, the crowd has
long been a factor in Iranian politics, and it cannot be lost on the Iran's leaders that they
came to power through domestic unrest. The economy has great potential, but it is also in
serious trouble, and if it worsens, the unrest will surely grow. Furthermore, a large part of
the world is moving rapidly toward greater social and economic freedom, including new
nations on Iran's borders. Iranians undoubtedly know this and desire the same freedoms
for themselves. In this environment, repressive government and dogmatic ideals cannot last
long without some tangible measure of success.
Rafsanjani has the best chance to deliver this success, and with popular pressure on
his side, reforms may continue to go forward. The presidential elections of June, 1993
were viewed as an important statement on the future political direction of the country.
When elected in 1989 Rafsanjani was the sole candidate for president. In 1993, 1 28
candidates registered for the election174 and three opposition candidates actually ran
against the incumbent. .Although limited in scope and very closely controlled, the
campaign had mixed results. Although Rafsanjani won handily with 63% of the vote, one
opponent received 24%. Though a landslide by Western standards, this was not the
mandate expected. Additionally, voter turnout was low (56%) in a nation where
mandatory voting is strictly enforced. ' ^ These indications can be taken as a sign of both
wider political participation and of voter apathy and disenchantment with the regime. It
must be noted that even refusal to vote is a vote of sorts. The real message may be that the
Iranian people are concerned about their own lives and have little support for a divided and
ineffective government. Whether this message carries any weight is difficult to say, but
Rafsanjani and his pragmatist cabinet survived the election largely in tact and seem




The international front has also seen changes within the past year. Iran's relations
with the Gulf Arabs took a sharp down-turn in September, 1992 when Tehran prohibited
movement of third-country nationals employed by the UAE to Abu Musa, and began
constructing military facilities there. Iran has held the island, along with the Greater and
Lesser Tunbs, since the Shah seized them in 1971. An agreement with Sharjah guaranteed
the rights ofUAE citizens who live and work on the island. In April 1993, the Majlis
passed a bill extending Iranian territorial waters to 12 miles, placing the islands inside this
limit, while Iran's foreign ministry denounced the Arab League's stand supporting the
UAE's claim to the islands. 176
There were also problems farther afield. Algeria recently broke relations with Iran
over Tehran's alleged support for the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front. ' ' There was also
increasing tension between Cairo and Tehran, as fundamentalist violence in Egypt
increased dramatically. President Mubarak accuses Iran of supporting violent extremists
from bases in the Sudan. Additionally, the Damascus Declaration, though never
implemented, was seen in Iran as a renewed attempt by Egypt to interfere in Gulf politics
and the balance of power there. The Rushdie affair, in which Tehran not only refused to
rescind the fetwa sentencing the author to death but vowed to send agents to kill him,
strained relations with Britain and the West in general. The hard-line clerics also alienated
Iran from the United States when Ayatollah Jannati, Khamenei's mouthpiece, stated that
"in preparation for the Third World War (between Iran and the West), Iran is activating its
anti-Western cells all over the world." 178 Washington, alarmed by the radical turn and
Iran's major re-armament program, moved to tighten sanctions on technology and critical
materials. The new administration has taken a harder line than President Bush, with
Secretary of State Christopher branding Iran an "international outlaw" in March, 1993.
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In spite of this, Iran's international fortunes in other areas were more positive. In
the face of the islands dispute GCC foreign ministers, convening in Abu Dhabi in
November, could not agree on whether or not Iran was a real threat. Some openly favored
distancing themselves from the Cairo-Tehran confrontation, backing off on the island issue
and not being alarmist over Tehran's rearming. l ,y Obviously the Gulf and the wider Arab
world remain divided over Iran and other issues as well. At any rate, the dispute over Abu
Musa was at least temporarily shelved when Iran restored the status quo in April (just after
changing the territorial limit) and allowed all those previously expelled to return to the
island. 1 80 Significantly, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev met with Rafsanjani in Tehran
in March. The purpose of the visit was apparently to increase bilateral economic and
strategic ties in order to strengthen stability in Central Asia. Kozyrev also said his task was
to demonstrate Moscow's support for the president's reforms. "There is no doubt that
Rafsanjani and the foreign minister, Velayati, are representatives of the moderate wing.
They are trying to move away from tough Islamic fundamentalism. But it must not be
forgotten that there is a second stratum, a shadowy stage on which completely different
forces operate." 181 This statement sums up perfectly the current situation of Iranian
politics.
It can be seen by the evidence offered above that the Iranian political situation is
still in a state of flux. This is due to the ideological nature of the governmental system and
the opposing political factions this has created. In short, the revolution is still going on.
Most observers agree that despite political in-fighting the Tehran government is
stable and legitimate, and is not likely to be overturned in the near term. Opposition
elements are too weak and marginalized and lack sufficient popular support to be a credible
threat to the clerical regime. More significant is the regime's survival of a long and
devastating war and economic isolation as well as the death of its charismatic leader and the
subsequent peaceful transfer of power. This says a great deal of its strength and resilience
in the face of overwhelming odds. It also signifies the strength of the Iranian nation and
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culture, together and in concert with Islam, as a unifying and stabilizing force for the
country. The government's realization of this and use of these elements is evidence of a
return to political reality and more rational policies. "Iran's process of transferring power,
its constitutional reform, and its increasingly more collegial and consensual politics and
decision-making show that Iran's political system is in many ways more mature than those
of many other Middle Eastern countries."^^
The government's strength and legitimacy do not mean that it can remain stagnant,
however. There are too many problems and contradictions for that. The political
developments since 1979 also
point to fundamental weaknesses of the regime deriving from the contradictions and
ambiguities inherent in its theological and legal foundations and the deep philosophical
divisions within its leadership...to survive and prosper the regime must reform and adapt
itself to the imperatives of running an effective government...in the process the regime
must accept a dilution of its more revolutionary characteristics. 1 °^
The question is not whether the government will change but how it will develop and which
way it will turn.
Still, the clerical leadership is far from unified and it is conceivable that there could
be a violent change from factions within the government. This could be triggered by an
external factor or unforseen event, such as another war or devastating economic collapse,
or an attempted takeover by either the moderate or radical faction which eliminates the
other element. Such a takeover could either be successful or engender a backlash by the
opposition, and may or may not be long-lasting. Given the regime's legitimacy and its
continuing if halting moves toward moderation it is likely that significant external forces
would be required to bring about such a radical change.
More likely the change will be evolutionary and non-violent in nature. This has
already begun to occur as Iran slowly re-enters the world economic and political system.
Revolutionaries cannot remain in power for long and still be revolutionaries. They have to
accept cooperation and moderation to bring about positive results of nation-building and
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maintain their legitimacy. Once gaining power they quickly become supporters of the
status quo. Iran has not yet completed this evolutionary process, however, and may not for
several years. Due to the opposing factions within the government, their relative balance
and their different bases of support, this process is severely complicated. Moderation is
likely to be a slow and drawn out affair, with many shifts in direction during that time.
However, it could occur more quickly if the moderate faction were able to make a bold
move to form a ruling consensus with significant popular support. What is clear is that the
radicals have only their revolutionary and largely rhetorical credentials to stand on, and
these are not enough to positively develop the Iranian nation. Therefore, the moderate
elements must eventually succeed. The only question is how long and what form the
change will take and how the United States can best influence and accelerate this process.
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VII. CONFLICT OR COOPERATION?
The events of 1988-1991 mark the most profound changes in the Middle East in a
decade. These include: the Iran-Iraq cease fire of August, 1988; the death of Ayatollah
Khomeini, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of communism in Eastern
Europe in 1989; the Gulf War of 1990-91; and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
These events have had the following results: the end of communism as an expansionist
ideology; elimination of an interventionist superpower on Iran's northern and eastern
borders; ascension of a more pragmatic but divided leadership in Tehran; effective
destruction of Iraqi political and military power, at least in the near term; heightened
American political and military leverage in the region; the opportunity for Iran to rebuild a
war-devastated nation; and the impetus for changing American strategy around the globe.
Taken as a whole, these changes shift the regional balance of power in Iran's favor, put the
Arab monarchies more firmly in the United States camp than ever, and clarify the political
situation in the Gulf. With no direct military threats in Iraq and Afghanistan, the lines are
clearly drawn between Iran and the U.S.-supported GCC states. The opportunity presents
itself for each side to choose between conflict and cooperation.
A. THE GULF WAR
The Gulf War is arguably the most regionally significant of the above events. The
invasion of Kuwait reaffirmed the nation-state system and exposed Saddam Hussein's
supposed protection of the Arab world against the Iranian threat as a sham. It also proved
that the United States would go to war to protect its vital interests in the region, and that
such a war would be waged overwhelmingry and decisively, thus removing any lingering
doubts about American military power and political will.
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Washington's huge display of military power and the certainty with which it destroyed
Iraq's regional might produced a different awareness of what America can do. The
perception changed to something that demanded more respect. * °4
Iran, with a front row seat for the conflict, could not fail to get the message.
By all accounts Tehran acted responsibly during the war, upholding the UN sanctions,
observing strict neutrality and cooperating with coalition forces. Especially significant was
Tehran's handling of the "defecting" Iraqi Air Force pilots, holding the airmen and aircraft,
and not allowing them to participate in the conflict from Iranian soil. Iran also took in
many Iraqi Shiite and Kurdish refugees who fled Iraq's internal strife immediately following
the war, and accorded them good treatment. Though there were fears of Iranian
adventurism in the form of either overt or covert support for Iraq against the common
American enemy, this did not materialize. Instead Iran called for Iraqi withdrawal from
Kuwait and was doubtless happy to see the reduction of Saddam's military accomplished in
such short order - something Iran had been unable to do in eight years of fighting. While
tacitly recognizing the necessity of American military action, Tehran did not wish to see an
enhanced U.S. presence in the region.
While demanding Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, Tehran ...continued to express
profound suspicions about U.S. objectives other than the eviction of Iraq from Kuwait
and to insist on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region after Iraq's withdrawal
from Kuwait. The Iranian leadership has not however, criticized Washington with the
same rhetorical intensity...recognizing that the reduction of the Iraqi threat is in its
• • IRS
strategic interest 10-'
B. OPENING THE DOOR?
Tehran gained considerable credibility with both the West and the Gulf Arabs due to its
stance during the war. In light of this and the many manifest changes cited above, there
appeared a chance for constructive engagement between Washington and Tehran. Indirect
communication during the war had blossomed into something approaching a dialogue. The
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two countries admittedly shared three common interests: containing Iraq militarily;
preservation of Iraq's territorial integrity; and the creation of a post-war security structure in
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which Tehran plays an important political role. 00 Even before the conflict with Iraq was
over, both President Bush and Secretary of State Baker alluded to the possible resumption
of ties. The President stated that the United States harbors no animosity toward Iran and
that Iranians should not be "treated forever as enemies" by the GCC states. * °' In a
testimony before Congress on February 6, 1991, Baker "praised Iran for its conduct during
the crisis and called it a major power in the Gulf that could play an important role in
building a reinforced network of new and strengthened security ties in the region-" 188
Iranian leaders made similar verbal moves. At a conference of Western, Asian and
Arab oil industry officials, including the Prime Ministers of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, at
Isfahan in May, 1991, Rafsanjani, Foreign Minister Velayati, Oil Minister Agazadeh and
Finance Minister Noorbakhsh openly sought increased ties with the industrialized world
and the Gulf states. Rafsanjani stated
The concluding years of the twentieth century are marked by world events that have
replaced the previous bipolar system by a new order. If this order is to persist,
1 OQ
cooperation should replace confrontation. 107
According to Velayati, "From a global perspective, a new order is gradually superseding in
which economic considerations overshadow political priorities." 1
"
The message was
clearly that the future well-being of Iran is tied to stable oil prices and economic partnership
with oil producers and consumers. Added Noorbakhsh, "now we are interested in
economic cooperation in the region and with the world instead of military
confrontation." 191
This rational outlook appeared to be more than just rhetoric. There were signs of
liberalization in Iranian society and government during this same period, which led to the
belief that Rafsanjani, as leader of the pragmatists, had succeeded in consolidating power
and felt safe in making changes. Women, while still required to dress modestly and cover
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their hair, had begun using cosmetics. Also, the "maghnaeh", a traditional black head
scarf, had become "outmoded" and was no longer sold by some shops in Tehran. During
Passover, Tehran televised a Jewish service and a Seder, which had not been done since
the revolution. The government instituted a birth control program to curb the country's 3.9
percent population growth rate. Under the program, some 70,000 women had been
voluntarily sterilized by early 1 991 . ^
Changes in government policy were also significant. The re-establishment of relations
with Egypt and the GCC states; approval of a World Bank loan for $200 million, the first
since 1979; and diplomatic efforts which resulted in release of Western hostages held by
Hezbollah were all positive signs of normalization. In a major ideological and political
shift, there were moves to merge the Komiteh with the regular police and the Pasdaran
with the regular military forces. These two organizations had become institutionalized as
enforcement arms of the ruling clerics and guardians of Khomeini's brand of Islam in the
chaotic days following the Shah's ouster. The dissolution of these politicized paramilitary
organizations would be a major step toward easing revolutionary zeal and moving toward a
more rational system. Although the merger was subsequently put on hold, there is
closer cooperation between them and the regular forces, and the merger may gradually
become an accepted fact.
The window of opportunity for U.S.-Iran relations was re-opened by the Gulf War.
Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait shattered the de facto Western-supported Arab
security system of the Gulf and redrew the political map of the region. While the
American position with the Arab monarches was indelibly strengthened, the conflict also
brought a chance for new ties with Iran. Initial moves along this line were undertaken even
before the war's end but they never came to fruition. In Iran, the increasing ties to the
West began to undermine the radical's position and engendered a strong backlash against
the moderate elements. The radical moves in turn served to distance the United States,
while greater concerns over the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, events in Moscow and
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domestic issues overshadowed the pursuit of ties with Iran. In spite of this the post-war
strategic situation has not been fundamentally altered. The current balance is tenuous and
the stakes are sufficiently high to make a Washington-Tehran dialogue worthwhile to both
sides.
C. ALLIANCES
If the United States is to influence Iran and promote any kind of stability in the Gulf, it
must work from a position of strength. We can work neither unilaterally and risk being
seen as an imperialist power, nor secretly and risk the appearance of undermining allies.
Instead we must cooperate with our allies in the region. Currently, America's most
important and reliable allies are the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The U.S. must
work for cooperation by exploiting its strong ties with these states. How these alliances are
used will shape the course of stability in the Gulf region and arc the keys to American
success.
1. The Gulf Cooperation Council
The Gulf Cooperation Council is arguably the most homogenous, and has the
potential to be the most successful, of the many international organizations in the world
today. The six member states are extremely similar in political systems, economy, culture,
history, religion and, of course, language. They face the same external and internal
problems and same prospects for the future. Their many similarities make them a natural
grouping and give the organization a great deal of legitimacy, as do their careful
guardianship of Islamic tenets and cautious approach to Western culture. They also hold
much of the world's proven oil reserves. As such, they are the most important U.S. allies
in this vital area and the foundation on which American policies must be based.
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Though not specifically, by the charter, a collective security organization, the GCC
functions as such for all intents and purposes. However, the member states have two
major problems in this respect - they are lacking in indigenous population and are
dependent on the United States for security against external aggression. The former
prevents these states from ever fielding a ground force with the capability to fend off any
potential regional aggressor, while the latter provides numerous political problems.
Though the Gulf War left the GCC more openly dependent on American
protection than ever, this dependence is accompanied by increased political changes within
these states and decreasing U.S. military force structure. Additionally, any future regional
aggressor surely learned from the war and is unlikely to "pull a Saddam". Tomorrow's
invader will not stop halfway and wait for the U.S. to build offensive striking power, so
that local forces must take the brunt of the initial battle. With the need to keep reactive
ground forces over the horizon and a shrinking military budget of its own, the United
States must work very carefully to strengthen the GCC's military capabilities.
While the GCC is a fairly homogenous grouping, it must also be recognized that
they are sovereign nation-states which act in their own self-interest and perceive issues
from their own unique vantage point. They have differing views on American cooperation
and access, the Palestinian question, and relations with Iraq and Iran. There are also a
number of unresolved disputes among them, and the smaller states are extremely wary of
Saudi Arabia. like their own internal societies, relations among the GCC states are finely
balanced on a variety of issues. While American involvement must be very cautious, our
support for their defense against external aggression must be unequivocal. At the same
time, the GCC must realize that quality of weapons, training and coordinated operations is
more important than quantity or monetary value of weapons purchased. Above all,
massive arms purchases and increasing military budgets with little ability to absorb this
equipment are not, and cannot ever be, the answer to their defense requirements. Instead,
such a course could serve to disequilibrate their societies, undermine the governments'
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legitimacy and contribute to a regional arms race which they cannot win despite their
wealth. Therefore, the United States must carefully curb arms sales while increasing
training and joint operations, promote cooperation with other states of the region, and
quietly encourage the kind of political and economic liberalization that will keep these
nations stable and viable allies.
It can be seen that while the GCC is a successful and unified organization when it
comes to security and that these nations are vital allies, they do not have the capability to
guard their own independence or the security of the Gulf. They also face domestic
political problems in relying heavily on America for their defense. They realize the unique
and complex political, ethnic and religious ties within the Gulf states, finely balanced
strategic situation and the need for increased economic and security cooperation. In
promoting regional stability, these states should form the basis of U.S. - Iranian and greater
multi-lateral cooperation. The U.S. should neither simply support regional security pillars -
which could collapse from within or without or threaten the peace themselves - nor fail to
pursue broader security ties due to the political fears or ambitions of allies. Rather,
America should use the GCC, already a successful cooperative organization, as the agent
through which to attempt confidence building measures with Iran. The Arab monarchies
understand the situation far better and have a greater stake in regional security than does
the U.S. The larger interests of the GCC also converge with those of the U.S. and Iran,
and must form an integral part of American strategy.
D. ASSESSMENT
In assessing Iran's current situation and capabilities the following trends emerge. There
is a building but still recovering military, gaining sophisticated conventional weapons and
possibly weapons of mass destruction, but not designed*for regional offensive operations
and possibly hurt by recent economic problems. The economy is struggling to recover
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from war damage and centralized mismanagement. Though oil production, industry and
agriculture are improving, unemployment and inflation are high and likely to increase, thus
feeding domestic unrest. Bold recovery steps have been taken, but the results are not yet in
and could go either way. Politically there is a deep division, with confrontational rhetoric
from the radicals while the moderates still attempt reforms. The hard-line clerics are loath
to let go of the ideological stance from which they derive their power and legitimacy, yet
they surely see the necessity for positive steps of nation-building. Whether the radicals are
firmly in control, some sort of deal has been struck, or the power struggle continues is a
matter of conjecture, and conflicting signals continue to be sent. Perhaps most
significantly, the political contradictions arising from the unique Islamic system of
government will eventually force the regime to moderate its stance on many key issues.
However, this system may follow an uncertain course and take several years to evolve.
The result is that Iran has great potential, growing capabilities and serious problems.
This is not to say that Iran is not a threat, but that they do not currently present an overt
threat of military aggression, especially if the United States continues its deterrent role.
However, Iran possesses a geo-strategic position, significant population, industrial
capability and growing technical capacity. It also has legitimate interests in the region and
will continue to work toward what it views as its rightful position. Due to the dual, yet
pluralistic political system and serious domestic problems, the Iranian situation is difficult to
understand and predict. Yet this is precisely why the United States must recognize these
interests and problems and formulate a strategy for dealing constructively with Iran. The
key will be the state of the Iranian economy, the domestic political situation, and the
American ability to understand both.
There is one other key issue which is pertinent to assessing Iran's role in the global and
regional system: Is Iran a status quo or revisionist power? A cursory glance at the regional
situation will suffice to answer this. The Soviet dissolution is obviously a major cause of
uncertainty. Iraq is defeated, semi-divided, and under international economic, political and
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military pressure. Afghanistan continues to be convulsed by civil war, as does Georgia.
Armenia and Azerbaijan are still at war after several years. The entire Transcaucasus and
Central Asia are rife with potential instability, as is Russia itself. India is experiencing
religious strife and the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir intermittently threatens to
explode. Iran's own ethnic minorities and the presence of nuclear weapons and major
external military forces in the region only exacerbate this situation.
In light of the numerous centrifugal forces and Iran's domestic political and economic
problems cited above we may conclude that it is in the interest of both Tehran and
Washington to increase stability in this troubled area. Far from being a threat, Tehran is
fortunate to be as stable and successful as they are. Though it may not be their ultimate
goal, Iranian leaders may well desire maintenance of the status quo for the present.
If we accept the fact that U.S. and Iranian interests coincide and that it is in American
interests to see a stable and moderate Iran, the question then becomes "How can the U.S.
best influence the moderation of the Tehran government and promote the stability of the
region?"
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VIII. CURRENT POLICY AND MAJOR ISSUES
A. DUAL CONTAINMENT?
On May 23, 1993 Washington announced a policy of "dual containment" of both Iran
and Iraq. This officially marked a reversal of U.S. attitudes, which had signalled a possible
rapprochement with Tehran following the Gulf War, and the beginning of a new, more
aggressive stance. The policy was officially due to signs of cooperation between the two
nations, specifically the Iranian purchase of Iraqi oil and steel in violation ofUN
sanctions. ^* While this may be quite valid, the policy was also a reaction to the extremist
sabotage of improving relations that had begun the previous year, and to the Israeli- and
Egyptian-led finger-pointing campaign which painted Iran as the new threat to American
interests in the Middle East. Whatever the motivation, a strategy of containment
(reminiscent of the Cold War and the Soviet threat) would seem to indicate an aggressive
policy of isolation pursued with international consensus against a nation which is deemed to
be a major threat to world peace and stability. Such actions were possible against the
Soviet Union in the bi-polar era and are still in place against Iraq more than three years
after its wanton aggression in Kuwait, but no such international coherence has emerged in
the case of Iran.
As of this writing then, a "containment" policy is not in effect. The actual policy was
articulated by Undersecretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs Edward Djerejian
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Jury 27, 1993. In his testimony Mr.
Djerejian enumerated five areas of Iranian behavior to which the United States objects and
seeks to change. These are addressed item by item below.
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1. Weapons of Mass Destruction
First is Iran's quest for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction....We are
particularly concerned with preventing Iran from acquiring the means to produce and
deploy nuclear ...and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as ballistic missiles. 5
This is certainly a cause for concern. However, Iran is hardly the only non-
superpower or non-superpower ally to have acquired or attempted to acquire nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles. Unlike some nations which have or are generally believed
to have these capabilities, such as Israel and India, Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. Additionally, they have recently passed IAEA inspections on their
nuclear power and research programs, and the inspectors concluded that Iran had no
weapons programs under development 196 These findings may be questionable, however,
especially in light of the surprisingly advanced stage of Iraq's program and the difficulty in
making accurate appraisals of it. Iran does continue to build nuclear power programs with
which it receives substantial assistance from China,^7 and already possesses nuclear
reactors of sufficient capacity to produce weapons-grade material. There are also
unconfirmed reports that Tehran may have already acquired tactical nuclear weapons from
Kazakhstan. However, U.S. intelligence estimates that Iran cannot develop indigenous
nuclear capabilities without substantial outside assistance before the end of the century. 9
As with almost every other issue concerning Iran, the answer probably lies somewhere
between the IAEA and the CIA reports.
Whatever the current situation, it is likely that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons
capability. It is also likely that if it gains such weapons Tehran will use them for political
prestige and leverage instead of to attack its enemies. The easily transportable tactical
weapons would pose a much greater potential for limited action than strategic ones.
However, any nuclear capability or any type of potential use of it would be detrimental to
Western interests.
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While the U.S. is correct to oppose the acquisition of mass destruction weapons by
Iran or any other state of the region, that is not the only question here. As alluded to
above, many nations attempt to gain such capacity for many reasons. Can Iranian attempts
to do so realistically constitute internationally objectionable behavior? If so, numerous
states fit the criteria, yet the U.S. carries on productive relations with them for other
reasons than opposition to nuclear proliferation. While this is the most valid behavior to
object to, it does not in itself constitute a reason for conflict.
2. Terrorism
Second is Iran's continued involvement in terrorism and assassination worldwide....Until
it abandons support for terrorism and terrorist groups, we will maintain existing unilateral
counterterrorism sanctions on Iran. °
Much has been made recently about Iranian support for terrorist and extremist
Islamic fundamentalist groups throughout the Middle East. Tehran has been accused of
sweeping support for Islamic opposition groups in Algeria, the Sudan, Egypt, Israel and
Lebanon. Yet the only place where Iran is known with certainty to be involved is Lebanon,
where it supports the Shiite Hezbollah guerillas. It must be recognized that all the nations
that claim Iranian sponsorship have serious internal problems of their own. Due to
political, religious and ethnic differences and problems of geography and finance, Iran has
little influence in any place except Lebanon, where the situation is admittedly unique and
complex and a substantial Shiite population exists. The problem is actually one of regimes
which are unable to handle domestic unrest and need to find a scapegoat. With little hard
evidence and the divisions inherent in the Muslim world, this is a hard story to swallow. *
It is true that Iran carries on its own brand of terrorism directly. This normally
takes the form of assassinations of exiled political opposition leaders. Most notable of
these was the killing of former Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar in Paris. These politically
motivated killings are certainly not calculated to make friends in the West and can be
described as terrorism of a sort. They are not, however, strictly random acts of violence
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perpetrated against innocent civilians for political ends. As far as can be determined, no
non-Iranian nationals have been targeted by Tehran for some years. This does not excuse
the recent murders, but it is a critical distinction when discussing state-sponsored terrorism.
While counterterrorism sanctions are perfectly valid, it is not clear whether the current
situation is sufficient to warrant conflict between the U.S. and Iran.
3. Arab-Israeli Peace Process
"The third area of Iranian behavior to which we strongly object is its support and
advocacy of violence to stop the Arab-Israeli peace process."^°^
The Arab-Israeli conflict and attendant Palestinian question form a pervasive
political issue in the entire Muslim world, and, in some cases, a military and economic issue
as well. Problems of Palestinian refugees and expatriate workers and the Arabs'
humiliating military defeats by Israel are keenly felt, as is America's wholehearted support
for the Jewish state. Though Arab leaders may give more lip service than actual support to
the Palestinian cause, they realize that their failure to gain a just solution to the problem
creates a ready target for political opposition groups. This failure, combined with the rise
of indigenous Islamic activism, gives Iran a ready-made situation with which to assert their
religious and political leadership of the Muslim world. Furthermore, the clerical extremists
must oppose Israel in order to affirm their legitimacy, bolster popular support and divert
attention from Iran's own internal problems, which are largely of the extremist's making.
Yet as discussed earlier, Iran's influence is mainly limited to Lebanon, an area which is
directly controlled by Syria. Therefore they have relatively little ability to stop the peace
process if the major parties are determined to move it forward.
American politics are also involved as domestic pressures demand unequivocal
support for Israel. Yet with the Cold War over, Israel is less a strategic ally than it ever
was. Hence Israeli attempts to explain their own internal troubles and make a new enemy
are calculated to garner continued U.S. support. In spite of domestic political realities, the
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U.S. must realize that only a solution to this conflict, or at minimum the appearance of
being a truly honest broker, can ease this overarching source of regional tensions and give
credibility to the U.S. position in the region.
The recent Israeli-PLO accords are a tremendous step in the right direction. There
are still many problems and it remains to be seen if the parties can carry through with the
agreement successfully, and if other nations, particularly Syria, will come to terms.
However, perhaps the U.S. can learn something from this agreement. In spite of their
mutual differences and distrust, Rabin and Arafat saw that it was in their common interests
to make amends. Their bold move undercut the extremist elements on both sides and
gained popular support. Similar moves are needed to overcome the confrontational
situation in the Gulf.
4. Subversive Activity
"The fourth aspect of objectionable Iranian behavior is its threats and subversive
activities against its neighbors. "^yjJ
There has been little subversive activity by Tehran against its neighbors since the
end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. The GCC states, including Saudi Arabia, have either
maintained or re-established formal relations with Tehran and economic cooperation is
increasing as well. While Bahrain and others may be subject to occasional rhetoric and
territorial disputes, this is not unusual for the region. This is essentially a non-issue at
present.
5. Human Rights
"Fifth is Iran's dismal human rights record, which is a matter of continuing
concern."
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Although Iran cannot meet Western standards in this category, it certainly is no
worse than most other nations of the region, including Israel and Egypt. In some areas,
such as women's rights, it is more advanced than many. This is also a non-issue in light of
more important geo-political concerns.
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B. THE REAL POLICY
Now that each area of objectionable behavior has been examined, it is necessary to
clarify the actual poKcy. According to Undersecretary Djerejian's statement, it is not one of
containment as is that imposed on Iraq. Rather it is merely one of sanctioning sensitive
technology exports and attempting to gain multi-lateral consensus on such sanctions. It is
the administration's position that comprehensive sanctions of critical material and
technology can effectively alter Iranian behavior. Also according to Djerejian, the policy is
not one of seeking to overthrow the Iranian government or dictate the form of that
government. Additionally, the administration claims to be open to a dialogue with Iran
with no preconditions.
Obviously this policy is fundamentally different from that of "containment" and
represents a partial re-assessment of the situation by the administration. It may be that the
Iranian threat is not as real as was originally thought, and that pursuing such an aggressive
policy is not feasible. This is primarily due to divergent interests on the part of Western
Europe and Japan on one hand, and the United States on the other, and to the failure of
Iran to present a broad-based, concrete threat to world order. The Europeans and
Japanese are heavily dependent on Gulf oil and are deeply invested in Iranian oil, gas,
petrochemical, transportation and industrial development projects. Tehran's largest trading
partners are Germany, Japan, Italy and France in that order. 5 Tehran badly needs
Western capital and technology to rebuild and develop their country, and the industrialized
nations see many long-term investment opportunities in Iran. Without the need for
American defense against the Soviets, our allies are free to pursue the almighty yen and
deutschmark without regard to U.S. political sensitivities. Neither is American business
immune to these incentives. United States are increasing rapidly and U.S. oil companies
are, collectively, the largest buyers of Iranian crude (marketed overseas due to the U.S.
embargo). " While Iran can be considered a bad risk, their recent economic reforms are
intended to bolster foreign investment. These have thus far succeeded, with both
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European and Japanese banks and governments extending Iranian credit to avoid
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default. ' In spite of the G-7 summit's political statement mentioning Iran,"uo there has
been no action from our allies on implementation of a containment policy. ^ Obviously,
with so many conflicting signals and interests in today's fluid strategic environment, forging
a consensus on Iran is going to be difficult.
Even if an international consensus on the current policy is reached, enforcing it will
prove quite difficult. In an age when multi-national corporations wield many of the same
capabilities of governments and are concerned more with profits than politics, some will
surely find a way around sanctions if the price is right. This was true even during the Cold
War, and the situation is much more fluid today. Unofficial transfer of militarily useful
goods and technology occurs on a regular basis, often being transhipped through third-
party nations or companies. While not impossible, enforcing such sanctions will require an
enormous effort and total cooperation by governments and industries around the world.
While much can probably be done if a consensus is reached by the major industrialized
nations, the effectiveness of such a course is still questionable.
Even if successful, the critical sanctions policy may not alter the Iranian behavior the
United States finds so objectionable. If truly bent on a confrontational course, the Tehran
government may modify its behavior long enough to gain access to the goods, technology
and capital it needs and then resume its radical posture. This is precisely what happened in
the Iran-contra affair. Another possibility presents itself, that of failure of this policy to
modify Iranian behavior at all. Even with critical sanctions effectively in place, Tehran
may not be damaged enough economically or politically to force moderation. Without
blocking Iranian oil from the world markets it is possible that they can continue in their
current condition for some time. Instead of changing Iran may become more self-sufficient
and more radical, a dangerous combination. While political moderation is eventually likely,
this could take years. It is in U.S. interests to accelerate this process. Sanctions may not
do the job. The West's experience with Iraq should be instructive in this regard.
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IX. UNITED STATES POLICY OPTIONS
Iran is the dominant state in the Gulf region due to its population, resources, strategic
location, and economic and military potential. Yet its radical political system, ideological
stance and enmity toward the United States have made comprehensive policy formulation
difficult for American administrations, to say the least. Yet the changes in world and
regional systems in the past few years have increased Iran's significance and made such
formulation even more imperative. The current policy of enforcing critical sanctions is not
yet in place and may not work even if implemented. Due to the delicate strategic balance
in the Gulf and Iran's threat potential, the United States has a choice of either aggressively
confronting Tehran or making bold moves to ease regional tensions. Ignoring Iran as
unimportant or adopting halfway measures will not help. To this end, some alternative
policy options are offered below.
A. ACTIVE CONTAINMENT
The U.S. should force Iran to change by isolating the country economically and
militarily.
If Iran really is a major threat to U.S. interests in the region America should pursue an
aggressive policy of isolation against Tehran. This should be comprised of a total
economic embargo enforced by military means, including strikes on military installations,
oil facilities and nuclear plants if necessary. These measures should stay in place until the
government undergoes a major change or agrees to abandon all internationally
objectionable behavior.
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Although this may be a conceptually easy solution to the "Iran problem", it is not
deemed feasible or necessary. Without the presence of the Soviet threat it will be difficult
to form a consensus when other nation's interests are not directly threatened. In fact it
would be detrimental to many nation's interests to pursue such a policy. Due to widespread
instability in the region, particularly the Caucasus and Central Asia, it is doubtful that Iran
could be effectively isolated in the northern and eastern border regions. Such aggressive
actions could conceivably push Tehran and Baghdad together, vastly compounding the
problem. Asking for broadly enforced economic sanctions and military measures now is
not realistic unless Tehran commits an overt act of aggression which puts it on the pariah
list like Iraq.
Even if feasible, this strategy could be counter-productive. Deeper isolation would hurt
the Iranian people and economy, strengthen the radicals by giving them a credible target for
their rhetoric, and drive the government to continue extreme measures such as terrorism
and possible use of weapons of mass destruction. It is also conceivable that an aggressive
containment policy could force a violent change in the Tehran government. Due to
regional instability and political and ethnic factionalism in Iran itself, violent change may
have unknown and lasting consequences for the nation and the region as a whole. Such
events would be impossible to control and could lead to dangerous proliferation of
weapons into unknown hands. Despite appearances, Iran may actually be a somewhat
stabilizing influence in an otherwise troubled area. Upsetting this status quo could
ultimately prove detrimental to American interests.
Finally, if such a strategy was adopted America would have to be prepared to conduct a
total armed conflict and to follow that victory with economic and political reconstruction.
Such a campaign would be extremely costly as well as domestically unpopular. If the
United States is not prepared to bear the costs of this strategy, as it was not in Iraq, it
should not be undertaken.
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B. UNCONDITIONAL ENGAGEMENT
The West should open to Iran economically and politically as the best way of
strengthening the moderate factions.
This is largely the European/Japanese view, and it is not without its merits. The
argument is that open engagement strengthens the pragmatists by improving the economy
and thereby their popular support base. A friendly and helpful West, healthy economy,
stable regional situation, significant popular support and exposure to Western influence
could enable the pragmatists to overcome the radical factions and speed Tehran's
moderation. Engagement would also allow increased dependence on the West, which the
radicals do not want. This could also loosen their hold on power.
The counter-argument to this is that giving Tehran what it wants plays into the hands of
the hard-liners, rewards extremism and will have no effect on behavior. Additionally an
improved economy could be used to continue threatening activities. Recent assassinations
on European soil is cited as a failure of their current engagement with Tehran.
Both of these arguments are probably valid to some extent. With the radicals still
holding the power that they do, engagement could result in an improved economy and
stronger nation with no political moderation. However, an important point needs to made
here. Engagement with Europe does not matter politically to Tehran. It is the United
States which is important. Economic issues aside, there can be no diluting of the extremist
position while the U.S. and Tehran remain at odds. A cooperative America would remove
the radical's favorite target and completely undermine their political position. One thing is
certain - Western engagement will not work if the United States is not involved. Only
Washington can make the difference here.
116
C. REALISTIC ENGAGEMENT
The United States should engage Iran politically and economically based on common
interests while attempting to limit the proliferation of weapons and technology and the
build-up of conventional military forces.
This approach would recognize that both Iran and the United States have converging
strategic and economic interests and would put aside political differences to jointly pursue
these interests. Practical steps in this process would be as follows:
1
.
Continue to work toward G-7 consensus on sanctions of sensitive material and
technology. To be a valid and workable measure, the focus would have to be
widened to include all states of the Gulf, including Saudi .Arabia.
2. lift restrictions on non-critical items of trade and aid (such as oil, commercial
aircraft and World Bank loans) and thaw Iranian assets still frozen in the United
States.
3. Continue to aggressively punish acts of international terrorism and make it clear
that such acts will not be tolerated in the future.
4. Engage Iran in a dialogue on security in the Gulf, preferably working through the
GCC. Such a dialogue would recognize both American and Iranian rights in the
region and the need to de-escalate tensions.
Opening to Iran economically to improve their oil production, industry, agriculture and
transportation would promote the interests of all parties involved. A healthy Iranian
economy and the improved standard of living, education and opportunities which would
accompany this would work to accelerate Iran's political freedom and moderation.
Increased cooperation and mutual dependence of the West, Iran and the Gulf states would
also result and increase the stability of the region. If the pragmatic factions of Iranian
leadership could show positive results of nation-building and cooperation with the West,
the extremists would be left with little but inflammatory rhetoric and no one to direct it at.
The efforts to limit access to weapons and technology are extremely important not only
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in regard to Iran, but to all nations of this volatile region, from Kazakhstan to Yemen and
Israel to Pakistan. If the United States is serious in promoting security and stability in the
Middle East, it must attempt to limit the destabilizing access to weapons and
disequilibrating military build-ups that have characterized recent years. Washington, as the
only remaining superpower, has an opportunity to do this but it can only succeed if such
controls are applied equally to all regional states. Only in this way can a consensus be
gained with our major allies and American credibility and intentions be clear and
unquestioned. If it is done in a confrontational sense or to strengthen one nation against
another, these efforts are doomed.
A security dialogue with Tehran is vitally important to the overall effort outlined above,
and could be the first step toward more open and productive relations and more stable and
long-term U.S. influence in the region. This could be a bi-lateral effort at first, possibly
with the Swiss, one of the Gulf states, or the Germans or Japanese as intermediaries. It
should not be done covertly, however, to avoid undermining the confidence of our Arab
allies. After initial talks it could be widened to include all of the GCC states and possibly
Yemen and Pakistan. The latter two are important because they have enough concerns and
interests in common with the GCC to warrant inclusion, yet, as "extra-Gulf' actors they
serve to balance the group and shift the focus away from an exclusively Gulf orientation
and its diametrically opposed attitudes. Additionally the Pakistanis would serve as another
non-Arab nation to shift the focus away from an Arab-Persian confrontation. This could
provide a forum for meaningful dialogue and eventually foster cooperation on security
issues of common concern, including arms control, border disputes, oil drilling and water
rights, military exercise notification, refugees, immigration, law enforcement, and disaster
relief. The main point, however, is that an inclusive security network overseen by the
United States is necessary to de-escalate regional tensions and bolster the delicate balance
that currently exists. This in turn would contribute to regime legitimacy and internal
stability of regional states and enhance economic development as well. If pursued
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comprehensively with non-proliferation efforts and economic cooperation this could serve
to increase regional stability, which is ultimately in United States' interests.
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X. CONCLUSION
The United States is a maritime power whose strategy is based on maintenance of
stability in areas of vital interest and accepted dependence on, and defense of, a system of
trade, communication and foreign resources. This strategy of access is more economically,
militarily and politically cost-effective than direct control of resources and territory.
America's vital interest in the Gulf is in promoting stability and security of the region and
ensuring the continued flow of oil at reasonable prices. Thus, the American objective is in
deterring aggression and promoting increased cooperation. While America holds the
predominant military power and can effectively deter overt aggression, such power is
inadequate to ensure our allies' internal stability or to control the sources of conflict
endemic to the region. While the U.S. must continue its military presence, this alone
cannot safeguard American interests. Furthermore, the United States military drawdown
and an unstable world situation makes long-term, large-scale military presence somewhat
questionable. Assuming that American interests will not change but overall force structure
will, and given the delicate balance of power currently in effect, promoting cooperation and
diffusing tensions becomes more important now than ever before.
Iran is the dominant regional actor due to its significant population, cultural heritage,
economic potential, strategic location and significant oil reserves. WTiile a nation of
fundamentally continental orientation, it cannot be considered a continental power in the
classic sense. Although striving for self-sufficiency, Iran is also dependent on international
trade and communications. It holds significant resources of its own and historically tends
to be a status quo vice a revisionist power over the long term. Direct territorial
aggrandizement is not its objective. Still, with its considerable resources, industrial capacity
and growing technical capability, Iran has a certain threat potential and should be dealt with
constructively. Iran's perspective is that it is at the heart of the vital southwest Asian region
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and that the Iranian nation has the legitimate historical and cultural right to dominate this
area. While Iran has long been frustrated in exercising this right, the dramatic changes of
recent years have presented Iran with a new opportunity to achieve its hegemonic
aspirations. If in fact this goal can be accomplished and how it will be pursued is
problematic. A key question is how Iranian interests and objectives coincide or conflict
with those of other regional powers, especially the United States.
American relations with Iran have historically been dominated by strategic interests,
both in containing Soviet expansion and ensuring the security of the Gulf. This strategic
relationship collapsed with the revolution, and economic interests have become increasingly
important. However, the sweeping changes of recent years have fundamentally altered the
regional balance of power and dramatically increased Iran's significance so that it can no
longer be ignored or isolated. This situation presents the United States with an opportunity
instead of an obstacle. Though Iran has the potential to be a threat to American interests in
the region, this potential has not yet been realized, and cannot be as long as American
power is preeminent. This must be kept in perspective. As was true under the Shah, Iran
cannot dominate its relationship with the United States unless Washington allows it.
Holding up Iran as a threat to the United States merely plays into the extremists' hands and
enhances their prestige. Iran is by no means a world power capable of threatening the
order imposed by the sole remaining superpower. America is obviously the dominant
power and can decide which way the relationship will turn. In spite of political differences,
American and Iranian strategic interests are basically the same. It is up to the U.S. to take
advantage of these convergent interests.
Both the United States and Iran are presented with a window of opportunity by the
Soviet collapse and defeat of Iraq. The U.S., able to deal from a position of overwhelming
military strength, should begin meaningful dialogue among the several nations of the region
in order to promote an inclusive regional security apparatus. A significant part of any
lasting security structure in the Gulf is the Iranian role and how Iran is engaged by the other
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Gulf powers, particularly the U.S. Will this engagement be conflictual or cooperative? No
one will argue that U.S. -Iranian cooperation is more desirable, but there are admittedly
problems with this approach. Not least among these are the issues of state-sponsored
terrorism, possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the deep scar left on the collective
American psyche by the embassy hostage crisis. While these areas must certainly be dealt
with, both governments must realize that it is in their mutual interests to avoid
confrontation. Most importantly, the U.S. must understand that there is a factionalized
power structure in Iran, shrug off the radical war of words and concentrate on what is done
rather than what is said. The U.S. routinely supports non-democratic governments,
including Islamic ones (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan), when it suits our interests with little regard
for human rights or democracy. We need to acknowledge this, put aside idealistic
requirements and deal pragmatically with Tehran.
A strategy of constructive, but realistically cautious, engagement is recommended for
Iran. A meaningful dialogue on arms control, regional security and economic assistance
could be first steps toward improving relations. Outside influence and cooperation from
the West would strengthen the moderate factions of government and assist popular
pressures for political and economic reforms. Diplomatic engagement and cooperation,
vice isolation, is a necessary step to controlling the arms build up, particularly the spread of
weapons of mass destruction. Political and economic pressure can also be applied to stop
the support of terrorism by Tehran, while terrorist organizations themselves are dealt with
directly, either by the U.S. or our allies.
Due to Iran's position and potential, there can be no true security of the Gulf without
Iran being involved. We may either aggressively confront the Islamic Republic or attempt
to cooperate with them under certain conditions. Ignoring Tehran or adopting halfway
measures which are politically palatable but ineffective will not help the situation. While
the United States military will continue to be the guarantor of Gulf security for the
foreseeable future, a U.S. -Iran security dialogue, pursued in conjunction with the GCC and
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possibly other states as well, could create a regional consensus which would enable
American policy to be implemented in a comprehensive manner and would help to
safeguard the interests of the U.S. and the other states involved while de-emphasizing the
military role. This would be a first step toward promoting stability and security of the area,
which is arguably America's number one interest.
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APPENDIX A
IRANIAN ARMED FORCES (see Note 1)
Personnel Regular Reserves Total
Army 300,000 350,000 650,000
TRGC 170,000 895,000 1,065,000
Basij 50,000 - 50,000
Air Force 35,000 - 35,000
Navy 18,000 - 18,000










Tanks AFV/APC Artillery Helicopters
700 MBT 750 1,300 100 AH-1J attack
40 Light 31 CH-47 transport
100 light utility
Note: Main Battle Tanks are mixture of Soviet/Chinese T-54/5 5/59/62 and some T-72;
U.S. M-48/60; British Chieftain. Light tanks are British Scorpion. APCs are also a mix of
Soviet BTR-50/60, BMP-1 and U.S. M-113.
PASDARAN.
Ground Forces. 150,000 personnel organized intol 1 regional commands, 24 infantry
divisions, 4 armored divisions.
IRGC is loosely organized into battalions which operate semi-autonomousry and are
administratively grouped into the above divisions. Also included are numerous
independent brigades with special functions (armor, paratroop, special forces air defense,
etc.). Primarily engaged in internal security and border guard duties, the IRGC may serve
with the army or independently.
Naval Forces. Some 20,000 Pasdaran personnel operate in a naval role, mainly from
islands and oil platforms. They operate lightly armed speedboats, coast defense artillery
and Silkworm missile sites. Currently under joint command with the regular navy.
Basij. The Basij is controlled by the Pasdaran and when mobilized are organized into 300-
350 battalions equipped with small arms only. They currently fulfill a political-ideological












2 (1 on order)
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130 (60 F-4, 60 F-5, 10 SU-24)
102 (60 F-14, 30 MIG-29, 12 F-7)
6 (5 P-3F, 1 C-130)
8 (5 RF-5, RF-4)
400
646
Note 1. Data in these tables is from The Middle East Military Balance, 1989-90,
Jerusalem Post Press, pp.21 8-224; Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, Jane's Information
Group Limited, pp. 293-294; The Military Balance, 1991-92, International Institute of
Strategic Studies, pp. 108-110. Most recent information was used when possible, so some
data presented here may not agree with all sources listed above.
Note 2. Iraqi aircraft acquired during the Gulf War are not included in these numbers.
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APPENDIX B
MILITARY EXPENDITURES OF MAJOR MIDDLE EAST NATIONS
Table 1 . As Percent of GDP.
1982 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
IRAN 4.3 3.4 2.6 2.5 3.0 3.0 -
IRAQ 12.3 18.4 24.3 29.1 26 24.2 24.3 23 20 20
S.A. 14.5 21.1 20.3 20.9 22 22.4 22.7 19.8 17.7 -
ISRAEL 23.5 19 20.2 21.4 14.4 11.3 10.2 9.1 8.7 8.4
Table 2. Calculated At Constant Prices (1988 US $ Billion).
1982 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
IRAN 10.23 8.5 8.1 9.7 9.3 7.7 7.4 5.7 5.3 6.1
IRAQ 21.95 28.6 31.6 23.5 16.5 17.1 12.9 10.7 9.2 7.4
S.A. 21.61 20.9 19.5 18.7 16.7 16.4 14.9 14.5 14.8 26
ISRAEL 7.3 8.0 8.4 5.2 4.3 4.1 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.9
Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament, pp. 260, 265.
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Table 3. Defense Budget to GDP Comparison. 1991.
Country GDP Defense Budget DB/GDP Ratio
Iraq 19.7 B 8.6 B .43
Saudi Arabia 88B 13.9 B .15
Israel 51.2 B 6.2 B .12
Syria 17.4 B 1.6 B .09
Iran 59.5 B 5.7 B .09
Egypt 39.5 B L7B £4
Source: Edward B. Atkeson, A Military Assessment of the Middle East, 1991-%, p. 6.
Table 4. Comparison of Social and Military Spending of the GCC.
Country Social Service Defense Budget






Figures shown are percent of GDP. Source: Arab Monetary Fund, 1989, p. 364.
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APPENDIX C
MOBILIZATION OF THE CITIZENRY
Comparison of Major Middle East Nations.
Country Population Armed Forces Soldier/Cit Ratio
Syria 12,784,800 404,000 1:32
Israel 4,822,000 141,000 1:34
Iraq 19,854,600 382,500 1:52
Saudi Arabia 7,600,000 111,500 1:68
Iran 53,766,400 528,000 1:102
Egvpt 56.018.800 420.000 1:133
Source: Edward B. ,\tkeson. A Militarv Assessment of the Middle East 1991-96, p. !
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APPENDIX D
ANTICIPATED IRANIAN ARMS ACQUISITIONS, 1991-1996
Combat Aircraft - 270-350 total
Confiscated from Iraq 115 MIGs and Mirages
Purchases from CIS/China 72 F-7 fighters
68 MIG-29 fighters
25 SU-24 strike acft
24 MIG-27 attack acft
24 MIG-31 fighter
12 TU-22M Backfire bombers
2 EL-76 Mainstay
Armored vehicles. 400-500 T-72 main battle
Missiles.
SSM 170 Scud B/C
150 Nodong I (N. Korea)
SAM 2000 launchers - various Russian designs
Submarines . 3 Kilo SS (2 received in 1993)
Source: Edward B. Atkeson, A Military assessment of the Middle East 1991-96. p. 34.
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*For a discussion of the perils of Wilsonian principles in the post-Cold War era see John
Gray, "Backward into the Future", National Review. March 29, 1993, p. 27.
^Norman S. Fieleke, "A Primer on the Arms Trade", New England Economic Review.
November-December, 1991, pp. 48-50.
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